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ABSTRACT
Stafford and Warr (1993) reconceptualized general and specific deterrence into a single
theory in which individuals’ propensities to engage in criminal behavior are based on some
combination of personal experiences with being punished and avoiding punishment and
vicarious (or indirect) experiences with being punished and avoiding punishment. The
researchers make a substantial contribution to the deterrence literature by accounting for the
effect of punishment avoidance when assessing deterrence theory. Despite the theoretical appeal
of this restatement, few studies have tested its empirical merit. The current study tests the
applicability of Stafford and Warr’s model but also addresses several key limitations that still
exist in the deterrence literature.
The present study was the first of its kind to directly test Stafford and Warr’s (1993)
model, blending specific and general deterrence, on an offending population. The majority of
perceptual deterrence research examines largely pro-social groups. Evidence suggests that
offenders may have unique decision-making processes and may be very different from those
typically studied in deterrence research. Identifying the relevant deterrents among nonconventional or offending populations has significant policy implications.
Additionally, in order to understand the decision-making process of criminals, this study
incorporated alternative sanction forms from a rational choice perspective into the deterrence
framework. This is a particularly salient point because non-legal costs may be more influential in
criminal decision-making than formal sanctions. By examining the deterrent effects of several
other factors (besides the traditional variables studied in deterrence models) among a nonconventional population, findings may suggest methods for designing more effective
punishments.
iii

Therefore, the present study conducted survey research of high-criminality among an
adult sample. This dissertation recruited 326 work release inmates from Orange County, Florida,
and asked them to complete a written questionnaire. Results from the bivariate analyses revealed
some support for the deterrence doctrine and the rational choice perspective. However, more
rigorous tests of these predictions revealed no support for deterrence theory. Even though this
study concluded that deterrence alone does not adequately predict future offending, the idea of
choice was upheld. The results from this dissertation and from several other studies suggest the
need for further analysis of the effect of extralegal sanctions on future criminal activity,
especially among non-conventional populations. The current study offers suggestions for
effective crime control policies and directions on how future research can clarify the
inconsistencies between the theoretical predictions of deterrence theory and empirical reality.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
For centuries scholars have attempted to explain and predict deviant behavior through the
study of criminological theory. Although many schools of thought exist, classical criminology
has had an enormous impact on the field of criminology and the legal systems of many countries,
including the United States and France. The ideas of classical criminology are most notably
attributed to Cesare Beccaria. In response to the cruel and arbitrary punishments that dominated
the legal system through the 1700s, Enlightenment thinkers advocated fair and just treatment for
all individuals. While the demonic perspective attributed crime to supernatural forces, classical
theory examined behavior from a more scientific or measurable approach.
The basic ideas of classical criminology are fairly straightforward. Classical
criminologists believe that individuals are rational actors who want to maximize pleasure and
minimize pain. Human beings pursue their own personal interests and engage in illegal acts if the
potential pleasures outweigh the possible pains. Criminal law has the ability to deter crime if the
perceived threat of punishments is swift, certain, and appropriately severe. Therefore, the legal
system is more effective if laws and punishments are known, and if judges apply these laws in a
nondiscriminatory fashion.
Beccaria’s An Essay on Crimes and Punishment (1764) and other works in classical
criminology have made worthy contributions to the foundation of the United States legal system.
The rational actors’ argument of classical criminology formed the basis of our legal system.
Hence the reason why we believe that it is fair and just to punish those individuals who commit
illegal acts. Another element of classical theory that is part of the foundation of our legal system
includes the idea that the law should be applied equally to everyone. For example, most
1

punishments are determined by the nature and severity of the crime committed rather than being
based on the characteristics of the individual offender. Furthermore, current proposals that
attempt to prevent or reduce crime through increases in punishment certainty and severity stem
from classical ideas.
Although classical theory was one of the first scientific theories of crime causation, its
key ideas influence contemporary versions of criminological theory even today. Numerous
theories of crime causation, both old and new, borrow the classical notion that individuals are
rational actors who conduct costs-benefit analysis. Consequently, those punishments that are
certain and just harsh enough to make illegal behavior less beneficial are predicted to have
deterrent effects.
The classical school of thought dominated criminology for nearly a century (late 1700s –
late 1800s). Although it lost some favor during the positivist movement, classical theory has
experienced a resurgence in the last several decades. In response to the perceived failure of the
rehabilitation of offenders in the 1970s, several economists and criminologists revived and
expanded the fundamental ideas of classical theory. The classical ideas of controlling crime by
increasing punishment certainty and severity came to dominate contemporary crime control
policies in the United States. The conservative era of the 1980s produced a number of initiatives
such as the “get tough” philosophy, the War on Drugs, and the adoption of harsher penalties for
violent and chronic offenders by many states (e.g., 10-20-life, “three strikes and you’re out”
laws). This shift in crime control policy away from rehabilitation and towards punishment,
incapacitation, and deterrence is credited with expanding correctional populations which have
more than quadrupled since the 1970s (Cullen & Agnew, 2003). Thus, classical theory provides
the underpinning for much of the theory and practice of contemporary criminal justice. As part of
2

that theoretical base deterrence remains a critical component for criminological theory and
research.
The basic tenets of deterrence theory have remained essentially unchanged for more than
two centuries. In effect, deterrence theory has been conceptualized as involving two separate
processes which by tradition are known as general and specific deterrence (Stafford & Warr,
1993; Piquero & Paternoster, 1998). General deterrence intends to influence everyone but the
single offender. The thinking here is that the punishment of a particular individual functions as
an example to other potential offenders, discouraging them from committing crimes by
demonstrating the negative consequences attending such behavior. Specific deterrence refers to
efforts that dissuade the individual offender from disobeying the law again in the future. Under
this notion of deterrence, the punishment is not delivered so as to impact anyone besides the
targeted individual (Gould & Sitren, 2005). The literature assessing the effects of specific and
general deterrence is substantial. Cullen and Agnew (2003) summarize this literature and
conclude that support for general deterrence is mixed and support for specific deterrence is
minimal. Due to the limited focus of previous research, however, it would behoove us to
examine the effect of factors besides punishment certainty, severity, and celerity on punishment
and crime levels. Identifying these factors is crucial to understanding the current salience of
deterrence theory, and to developing more effective punishments and crime control policies.
Recently, Stafford and Warr (1993) made a significant contribution to the deterrence
literature. Even though the basic conception of general and specific deterrence is commonly
accepted, Stafford and Warr’s (1993) piece has caused many criminologists to rethink the sharp
distinction between general and specific deterrence. Stafford and Warr (1993) note several
limitations with the traditional notion of deterrence. First is the assumption that general
3

deterrence and specific deterrence affect different types of people (the general public versus
punished offenders). Both specific and general deterrence are part of the deterrence process.
However, general deterrence is focused on an individual’s indirect experience with punishment
while specific deterrence is focused on an individual’s direct experience with punishment. To
address this significant limitation, Stafford and Warr (1993) proposed a reconceptualization of
deterrence in which general and specific processes are integrated. They claimed that all persons
could be influenced by experiencing punishment directly (specific deterrence) as well as by
experiencing punishment indirectly when other people are punished (general deterrence). The
second limitation noted by Stafford and Warr is that traditional notions of deterrence focus only
on the effects of being punished. The potential effects of avoiding punishment for an illegal act
are ignored. Stafford and Warr claim that experiences with avoiding punishment may do more to
encourage criminal behavior than punishment does to discourage crime. Therefore, they
introduce the concept of punishment avoidance into the deterrence framework. A third
shortcoming of the basic conception of separating general from specific deterrence is the
assumption that an offender’s direct experience with punishment (i.e., specific deterrence) is the
only important variable when predicting future behavior. However, offenders may not always
experience punishment and often commit more than one kind of crime. Surely, most individuals,
including offenders, will have some combination of indirect and direct experiences with legal
punishment and experiences with avoiding punishment.
To address these limitations, Stafford and Warr (1993, p. 127) redefine general
deterrence as the “deterrent effect of indirect experience with punishment and punishment
avoidance” and specific deterrence as the “deterrent effect of direct experience with punishment
and punishment avoidance.” An individual’s direct and indirect experiences with punishment
4

will increase his or her perception of the certainty, and perhaps severity, of punishment. In turn,
these experiences will decrease the likelihood of future offending. Conversely, direct and indirect
experiences with avoiding punishment will increase the future tendency to offend by reducing
the perceived certainty of punishment.
Stafford and Warr (1993) make a significant contribution to the deterrence literature.
First, reframing these concepts allows for general and specific deterrence to pertain to any
individual in any population. Second, Stafford and Warr (1993) introduce the concept of
punishment avoidance, which they argue might be more influential to the deterrence process than
punishment itself. Very few studies have tested Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization
of deterrence. Preliminary analyses reveal support for the notion that personal and vicarious
experiences with punishment and punishment avoidance do influence future offending. However,
these studies also raised some issues and suggest the need to move beyond deterrence principles
to predict and explain criminal behavior.
The current study seeks to test the core predictions offered by Stafford and Warr (1993).
This study also addresses several limitations that still exist in the deterrence literature. First,
deterrence researchers have typically focused on conventional populations. Deterrence theory
has been tested in only limited ways with experienced offenders. Several criminologists argue
that offenders may be different than those typically studied in deterrence research (Piliavian,
Gartner, Thornton, & Matsueda, 1986; Decker, Wright, & Logie, 1993). Evidence suggests that
offenders are more impulsive, risk seeking, and may employ unique decision making processes
(Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Pogarsky, Kim, & Paternoster, 2005). Therefore, the present study
examines the deterrent effects of personal and vicarious experiences with punishment and
punishment avoidance among a group of offenders. According to several criminologists, the
5

salient deterrents may be very different for offending populations (Piliavin et al., 1986; Decker et
al., 1993). As such, identifying the relevant deterrents has significant policy implications.
Because the majority of perceptual deterrence research has studied conventional
populations, the range of offenses considered has been very limited. Piliavin et al. (1986) note
the great importance of determining the explanatory power of a deterrence model by expanding
the range of offenses considered. This study uses a sample of offenders and is therefore able to
expand the range of offending behaviors to include more serious criminal acts.
A third limitation in previous studies has been the lack of attention to the extralegal costs
and benefits of the decision-making process. According to Paternoster (1989), perceptual
deterrence researchers have rarely integrated their tests into an overall model of social control.
Even though the threat of moral condemnation and informal sanctions of behaviors have been
included in some analyses, the significance of these variables has not been appropriately
examined. Several studies have found considerable support for examining the effect of non-legal
considerations of offending decisions (Paternoster, 1989; Nagin, 1998; Nagin & Pogarsky,
2001). In fact, the deterrent effect of extralegal sanctions may be as great a deterrent as legal
sanctions. These considerations are elements of a rational choice perspective, and Stafford and
Warr’s (1993) theory may also benefit from their addition. Therefore, this dissertation integrated
several extralegal considerations into Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization.
Fourth, prior tests of Stafford and Warr’s (1993) model have considered only offensespecific experiences with punishment and punishment avoidance. Research shows that most
offenders do not “specialize”, committing only one type of offense (Gottfredon & Hirschi, 1990;
Moffitt, 1993). Therefore, offenders may be influenced by their experiences with being punished
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or avoiding being punished for crimes beyond the one specifically under consideration by a
researcher.
In sum, this study contributes to the deterrence literature in several significant ways. First
and foremost, this study tests Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization of general and
specific deterrence. Stafford and Warr (1993) introduced several other salient variables not
previously considered in the deterrence literature. Additionally, this reconceptualization has
remained largely untested. Second, this study conducts survey research of high-criminality
among an adult sample. Third, integrating experienced offenders in a test of deterrence theory
also allows for expansion of the range of offenses to include more serious crimes. Fourth, in
order to understand the decision-making process of criminals, this study incorporates alternative
sanction forms into the deterrence framework. As previously mentioned, the legal system is
largely theoretically dependent on the deterrence model. By examining the deterrent effects of
several other factors (besides the traditional variables studied in deterrence models) among an
offending population, findings may suggest methods for designing more effective punishments.
Thus, this study has significant policy implications for crime control strategies. The next chapter
presents a review of the literature, beginning with a brief review of the theoretical context of
deterrence and a discussion of the current issues and empirical status of deterrence theory. Next,
empirical tests of Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization are discussed in detail. Finally,
several key limitations are identified in the existing deterrence research and a discussion of how
the current study addresses those limitations is presented.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
According to classical theory, individuals are more or less free to choose crime as a
behavior. These decisions are based on rational calculations of the costs and benefits related to
crime. Individuals commit crimes when they believe that the benefits outweigh the costs of an
action. Deterrence theory most fully embodies the classical school of thought. Deterrence
theorists claim that crime is a free-will choice, and individuals are rational actors with the main
goal of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. Therefore, individuals will engage in crime
when they believe it is in their best interest. According to this frame of thought, the best way to
prevent crime is through certain, severe, and swift punishments (Einstadter & Henry, 1995;
Cullen & Agnew, 2003).
This chapter begins with a brief review of the major families of theories, outlining the
theoretical context of deterrence. Deterrence theory was among the earliest explicit theories of
crime, originating from the ideas of Cesare Beccaria (1764) and Jeremy Bentham (1789). While
many theorists and criminologists have entertained other schools of thought, the popularity and
prominence of deterrence theory have persisted. Moreover, deterrence theory has never been
fully rejected and has actually experienced a resurgence in the past several decades (Lilly,
Cullen, & Ball, 2002). The next section addresses the current issues in deterrence theory. Several
recent, major developments have influenced deterrence theory, including the emergence of
rational choice theory, the expansion of the deterrence doctrine beyond legal penalties, and the
integration of other criminological theories, such as self-control and social learning theories, with
rational choice. Most important, Stafford and Warr (1993) integrated concepts from social
learning theory into their reconceptualized theory of deterrence in which general and specific
8

processes are brought together. This discussion is followed by a review of the empirical status of
deterrence and an analysis of the empirical tests of Stafford and Warr’s reconceptualization.
Finally, several key limitations are identified in existing deterrence research and a discussion of
how the current study addresses those limitations ensues.

Theoretical Context of Deterrence
Throughout history, scholars have considered why certain individuals engage in criminal
behavior. In response to the cruel and arbitrary punishments of the Dark Ages (e.g., whippings,
hangings, torture, and mutilation), Enlightenment thinkers believed that the world could be better
understood and subsequently changed through science. Classical criminology, a product of the
Enlightenment, additionally asserts that individuals are free-willed and solely responsible for
their actions. Classical criminology refers mainly to the ideas of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy
Bentham (Akers, 2000). Bentham’s (1789) hedonistic calculus is rooted in the idea that
individuals are free-willed and able to weigh the potential pleasures against the possible pains of
an action. Individuals are rational actors who calculate a cost-benefit analysis with the central
element being pleasure versus pain. Based on rational calculations, individuals freely choose all
behavior with the choice going towards the maximization of individual pleasure. Beccaria’s 1764
influential piece, On Crimes and Punishment, is credited with presenting most of what we call
classical criminology. Beccaria believed that both the right to punish as well as other
fundamental aspects of society emanate from the social contract. The purpose of punishment –
which should be proportionate, legislated, prompt and certain, public, and necessary – is to act
solely as a deterrent.

9

Both Beccaria’s and Bentham’s ideas inspired revolutions and the creation of completely
new legal codes (Lilly et al., 2002). Classical ideas such as doing away with cruel and unusual
punishment and the right to a speedy trial were included in the Constitution of the United States.
Other ideas such as a fixed scale of punishment for each type of crime were integrated into the
new legal codes of France in 1791, following the French Revolution (Akers, 2000). However, by
the early 1800s crime was still flourishing (Rothman, 1971). The belief that criminal behavior
could be explained by hedonism was loosing support as the argument that aggravating and
mitigating circumstances became more significant for diminished responsibility among
offenders. The Enlightenment’s previous view of the rational man was unable to explain all
crimes. Thus, the search for the “criminal man” ensued, with an emphasis on pre-determined
actions as opposed to the rationality of man; free will was no longer perceived as the origin of
criminal actions. The supporters of this new way of thinking came to be known as positivists
(Lilly et al., 2002).
In contrast to classical theory, positivists assert that human behavior is determined rather
than chosen (Davis, 1975). Early positivist thinkers sought empirical evidence that the cause of
crime was linked to certain individual attributes, with particular emphasis on the mind and the
body (Lilly et al., 2002). Criminals are perceived as being fundamentally different -biologically, psychologically, sociologically, or some combination -- from non-criminals (Matza,
1964). Between the time that Beccaria graduated from the University of Pavia in 1758 and
Cesare Lombroso’s graduation from the same institution a century later, there was a shift from
theological explanations of humans to a biological one. It was this context of biology, evolution,
and Darwinism that greatly influenced Lombroso (Wolfgang, 1973). Lombroso (1911) believed
that individuals with certain physical characteristics were biologically inferior to others. He
10

called these persons atavists, or throwbacks to a more savage ape-like being. Lombroso
identified several physical characteristics found among criminals, such as sloping foreheads,
misshaped noses, excessively long arms, ears of unusual size, and receding chins, and ascribed
these characteristics and criminality to lesser evolution.
Modern biocriminologists assert that criminal behavior results from complex biological
and environmental interactions, rather than citing the traditional value judgment of inferiority.
Additionally, biology or genetics is not necessarily the cause of crime but rather predisposes
individuals to deviant behaviors. Such individuals are also influenced by environmental and
social conditions (Fishbein, 1990). Current research has revealed several biological connections
to criminal behavior. Fishbein (2000) notes a few of these factors to include vitamin, mineral,
and chemical deficiencies in the diet, low blood sugar, diets laden with sugar and carbohydrates,
attention deficit disorder, exposure to radiation, and other brain dysfunctions.
Neuropsychological models of delinquency have also been developed to incorporate IQ and
other aspects of mental functioning such as mental flexibility, verbal ability, and visual-motor
integration (Moffitt, Lyman, & Silva, 1994).
Instead of contending that criminals are biologically inferior, psychological theories
assert that criminals are mentally inferior. This form of positivism, the psychogenic school of
thought, focuses on the mind rather than the body. Sigmund Freud is largely associated with
psychoanalytic theories. Although Freud did not directly address the causes of crime, his general
theory of human behavior is often applied as a theory of crime causation (Akers, 2000).
According to Freud (1920), human behavior is motivated and purposive. In order to preserve
social order, desires and behavior that are socially unacceptable become repressed into the
unconscious of the mind. The effect is that stress exists between the unconscious id and the
11

conscious ego. While the id represents a multitude of aggressive psychological and biological
urges, the ego is the mechanism that controls the individual. Freud (1920) asserts that the
superego judges right from wrong and good from bad based on the behavioral requirements of a
particular culture. Therefore, crime is a manifestation of the inner conflict that each individual
has but fails to control (Lilly et al., 2002).
As embodied by Freud’s (1920) theory of human behavior, psychoanalytic and
personality theories acknowledge that personal experiences, especially those in early childhood,
influence the development of personality traits, types, and overall emotional development.
Deviant behavior is therefore a symptom of some underlying emotional or personality problem.
Personality theories either attribute crime to personality traits such as impulsiveness,
rebelliousness, hostility, aggressiveness, and thrill-seeking, or to personality types which include
anti-social, psychopaths, or sociopaths. Psychopaths, sociopaths, and those with anti-social
personalities are characterized as self-centered individuals who have not been properly socialized
and therefore lack empathy for others and lack a sense of guilt or remorse for their misconduct
(Andrews & Bonta, 1998). Yochelson and Samenow (1976) developed a theory of criminal
personality in which individuals of this sort have no sense of guilt or conscious, no conception of
right and wrong, and freely choose to commit crimes. Slightly different from psychopaths,
individuals with a criminal personality are fearful of embarrassment, injury, and death. In sum,
psychological, psychoanalytic, and personality theories emphasize that crime results from
inadequate or abnormal emotional development, or deviant personality traits or types.
Most of the early criminological theories located the sources of crime within the
individual, whether that was in the soul, the mind, or the body (Lilly et al., 2002). But as the
United States entered the 20th century, a major theoretical shift occurred, suggesting that crime
12

was a social product. Many of the major sociological theories of crime – including anomie or
strain theory, social disorganization theory, differential association, and control theories – have
been heavily influenced by Emile Durkheim. Durkheim (1964) believed that crime is a normal,
functional aspect of society. Crime is considered normal because it is found in all societies.
Crime is functional because it establishes the boundaries for morality. As noted by Bohm (2001),
individuals would be unaware of acceptable behavior if crime did not exist. Crime is also
functional because it unites people against it, thereby creating social solidarity (Durkheim,
1964). Durkheim’s ideas were cultivated during a period of social change, technological change,
the rise of capitalism, the industrial revolution, and the erosion of community. Durkheim focused
on the increasing, forced division of labor separating individuals into occupational specialties.
For Durkheim, anomie signified a breakdown of the fundamental bonds uniting individuals into a
collective social order. Anomie represented the complete collapse of social solidarity.
By the late 1930s, two major criminological traditions had been cultivated: the Chicago
school of thought and Merton’s strain theory (Lilly et al., 2002). The Chicago School proposed a
relationship between social disorganization, detachment from conventional groups, and
delinquency. According to the Chicago School, one aspect of American society, the city slums,
contained certain criminogenic factors. Park and Burgess argued that the development and
organization of cities is explained by social processes such as invasion, conflict, dominance, and
succession. That is, cities expand and grow radially in concentric circles, and a cultural group
invades an area occupied by another group and controls that area until it is succeeded by another
group. These social processes weakened family ties and neighborhood controls resulting in social
disorganization, the source of many social pathologies including crime. Many scholars, most
notably Shaw and McKay (1972), utilized this model of human ecology in their studies of
13

juvenile delinquency. Through their research, Shaw and McKay were able to conclude that
neighborhood disorganization was instrumental in the permission of delinquency.
Anomie or strain theory uses a systems model to describe society and attributes crime to
the social structure. Merton (1938) observed a disconnect between cultural goals and the social
structure. That is, the social structure restricts the ability for all individuals to achieve success
through legitimate means. A strain is placed on those individuals, most likely members of the
lower class, who desire the goal of success and wealth but who are unable to attain those goals
through conventional avenues. As a result, some individuals experiencing strain resort to
illegitimate means to achieve success. Therefore, the source of some crime or delinquency was
anomie or strain.
More contemporary models of anomie or strain include Agnew’s (1992) general strain
theory. He argues that individuals may not be as goal oriented as Merton had originally
suggested. Other situations, besides monetary success and the American dream, have the
potential to create strain and encourage crime. More specifically, other sources of criminogenic
strain result from the actual or anticipated loss of a positive stimulus or the actual or anticipated
presentation of a negative stimulus (Agnew, 1992). In other words, people are more interested in
being treated in a fair and just manner. Agnew (1992) revised Merton’s paradigm of social
structure and anomie towards a general strain theory of crime which examines other sources of
criminogenic strain.
In further exploration of the social roots of crime, Sutherland (1939) contended that
criminal behavior is learned through social interactions. Sutherland coined the term differential
social disorganization claiming that social groups are arranged differently, some promoting
crime and others against deviant behavior. Individuals who embraced deviant behavior did so
14

because of an excessive amount of definitions favorable to lawbreaking rather than definitions
unfavorable to violating the law. Learning theories have been developed more broadly to
encompass the concepts of differential association and Sutherland’s theory (Burgess & Akers,
1966; Akers, 1985). In short, learning theories attribute criminal behavior to positive
reinforcement, negative reinforcement, or imitation (Bohm, 2001).
Social bonding and control theories examine delinquency from a different perspective,
examining why individuals conform. That is, they argue that crime is natural and will occur if
individuals are not properly socialized. Control theories claim that individuals conform because
social controls prevent them from engaging in deviant behavior. Hirschi’s (1969) social bonding
theory is one of the earlier control theories. According to Hirschi (1969), “delinquent acts result
when an individual’s bond to society is weak or broken” (p. 16). This bond consists of four main
components: beliefs, involvement, commitment, and attachment. Individuals are more likely to
conform when social bondings of these elements are stronger to parents, adults, school teachers,
and peers. The weaker the bonds, the more likely the individual will be to engage in unlawful
behavior. More recently, Hirschi collaborated with Gottfredson and moved away from his classic
social bonding of control theory and towards a theory focused on one type of control – selfcontrol (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). According to this theory, people with lower levels of selfcontrol are more likely to engage in criminal activity at all times in their lives while people with
greater self-control are less likely to engage in crime. Furthermore, Gottfredson and Hirschi
(1990) attribute low self-control to ineffective socialization, particularly with ineffective child
rearing.
Similar to sociological theories, critical theories believe that human behavior is
influenced and constrained by societal institutions and structures. However, critical theories
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further assert that human beings create these institutions and thus, have the ability to change
them (Bohm, 2001). Interactionist and labeling theorists shift their focus to the criminalization
process, considering whether stigmatizing someone as criminal actually leads to more crime than
it prevents. Such theories attempt to predict secondary deviance based on a negative social
reaction experienced by first-time offenders (Becker, 1963).
While classical and positivist theories believe that society is characterized by consensus,
conflict theory believes that society is primarily characterized by a struggle between competing
groups. Because dominant interest groups are able to use crime and the law to control
subordinate groups, crime is believed to be caused by relative powerlessness (Marx & Engels,
1992/1848; Vold, 1958). Unlike conflict theory, radical theory considers competing interest
groups and the existence of classes as distinct phenomena. Radical criminologists tend to focus
more on the social arrangements of society, in particular, the political and economic structures of
capitalism. Crime, defined as a violation of human rights, results from the political economy that
encourages individualistic competition to acquire material wealth. The more unevenly wealth is
distributed in a society; the more apparent are class struggles and exploitation (Bohm, 2001).
Other critical theories have redirected attention to crimes committed against the working class
(British or Left Realism), the transformation of individuals and restorative justice (Peacemaking
Criminology), the female perspective and experiences (Feminism), and an emphasis on the
unconscious and multiple viewpoints on the law (Postmodernism and Poststructuralism) (Akers,
2000).
With the perceived failure of rehabilitation as well as the increase in crime rates during
the 1970s and 1980s, attention returned to an analysis of the criminal decision-making process as
the country shifted back towards conservatism. The conservatism of the 1980s formed a context
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contributing to the revitalization of the classical school of thought, with a shift from viewing
crime as a social problem to viewing crime as a problem of individual pathology. The rationality
of individuals and the positivist approaches of crime due to biological or mental anomalies
received increasing consideration (Lilly et al., 2002). Wilson and Herrnstein’s (1985) Crime and
Human Nature epitomized this return of individualistic explanations of crime. According to
Wilson and Herrnstein (1985), certain constitutional factors, some of which are genetic,
predispose individuals to engage in criminal behavior. These constitutional factors influence an
individual’s ability to evaluate future and immediate rewards and punishments. This emphasis on
rewards and punishment was also supported by the classical school of criminology. As
previously discussed, individual acts of crime were deterred with punishments designed to
outweigh the benefits of offending. Several additional research findings received more attention
during this time period as well. First was the evidence linking a large number of offenses to a
small portion of individuals, thereby suggesting something wrong with those particular
individuals (Wolfgang, Figlio, & Sellin, 1972). And second was the data indicating that violent
criminals tended to exhibit aggression and crime at an early age, suggesting less importance on
the environment and more on the physiological make-up of individuals (Loeber & Dishion,
1983).
Wilson and Herrnstein’s (1985) biosocial approach was not the only revitalization that
the classical school of thought experienced during this time period. The development of
economic and rational choice models claimed that individuals were rational actors who choose
deviant behavior when the benefits outweighed the costs. Political implications drawn from these
models are largely deterrence theories. Crime may be reduced by increasing the risks of
punishment or by increasing the rewards for conformity.
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Based on these research findings, the conservative political context of the time supported
certain policy initiatives, mainly incapacitation and deterrence. First, one major policy initiative
advocated incarceration of larger numbers of individuals for longer periods of time. As suggested
by rational choice theory, lengthy incarcerations will deter both lawbreakers from future criminal
activity as well as those individuals considering crime. Second, those individuals beyond reform
must be incapacitated. In summary, policy implications of conservative theory advocate the need
to incapacitate selectively (just the most persistent offenders) and punish more harshly to
discourage offending. In other words, deter the calculating and incapacitate the wicked (Lilly et
al., 2002). The recent revitalization of the classical school of thought has also led to the
development of contemporary versions of classical theory, including rational choice theory, the
expansion of the deterrence doctrine beyond legal penalties, and the integration of rational choice
with other criminological theories, especially with the concepts from self-control and social
learning theories. These recent developments will be discussed in the next section.

Current Issues in Deterrence Theory
The expansion of deterrence has been most associated with the development of rational
choice theory. Developed from the concepts of expected utility theory, rational choice theory
believes that individuals are rational actors who are expected to maximize profits and minimize
losses. Rational choice theory was developed most fully by Cornish and Clarke (1986). Clarke
and Cornish (2001) assert that individuals are influenced by many factors such as intelligence,
family upbringing, gender, neighborhood, status, and temperament. Criminal decision-making is
purposive with the intention to benefit the offender. Additionally, rational choice theorists often
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adapt the concept of limited or bounded rationality. These models of partial rationality integrate
constraints on choices through limited information, moral values, and other influences on illegal
activities (Akers, 2000). Still, under this context, criminals are assumed to be rational actors
(Lilly et al., 2002).
In addition to rational choice theory, Pratt, Cullen, Blevins, Daigle, and Madensen (2006)
note several other recent, major developments that have influenced deterrence theory. The first is
the importance of structural constraints that may limit the choices of potential offenders. This
situational crime perspective assumes that criminals will engage in illegal activity unless some
external factors exist that discourage such behavior. According to routine activity theory, crime
will occur when individuals are faced with opportunities detached from capable guardians that
may act as a deterrent (Cohen & Felson, 1979).
The second major development in deterrence theory has been the introduction of new
concepts that expand the deterrence doctrine beyond legal penalties. This is a particularly salient
point because non-legal costs may be more influential in criminal decision-making than formal
sanctions (Pratt et al., 2006). For example, Braithwaite (1989) suggests that the potential for
shame and loss of respect associated with being apprehended for engaging in criminal behavior
is a major influence in the rational decision-making process. Akers, Krohn, Lanza-Kaduce, and
Radosevich (1979) and Grasmick and Green (1980) found deterrent effects among informal
sanctions, such as individual moral commitments and disapproval of family and friends.
According to Pratt et al. (2006), the introduction of social costs has been shown to have a
deterrent effect on behavior.
A third trend in the deterrence framework has been the integration of rational choice with
other criminological theories – especially with the concepts from self-control and social learning
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theories. Piquero and Tibbetts (1996) introduced concepts from situational crime prevention and
self-control theory. An individual’s level of self-control is believed to influence perceptions of
situational constraints (i.e., perceived pleasure and shame) and sanction risk perceptions. Piquero
and Tibbetts (1996) found that individuals with low levels of self-control perceive greater
pleasure from offending, less situational shame, and a lower likelihood of being apprehended.
Paternoster (1985) introduced variables from both social learning theory and social bonding
theory by examining the perceived risk of informal sanctions from parents and peers as well as
moral beliefs and attachment to family and friends.
Stafford and Warr (1993) also integrated concepts from social learning theory into their
reconceptualized theory of deterrence. Deterrence theory has been conceptualized as involving
two separate processes which by tradition are known as general and specific deterrence (Stafford
& Warr, 1993; Piquero & Paternoster, 1998). General deterrence aims to influence more than
just the single offender. The punishment of a single person serves as an example to other
potential would-be offenders, discouraging them from engaging in criminal behavior by
illustrating the negative consequences they could expect. Specific deterrence refers to efforts that
dissuade an individual offender from breaking the law again in the future. Under this aspect of
deterrence, the punishment is not predicted to influence anyone besides the targeted individual
(Gould & Sitren, 2005).
Piquero and Paternoster (1998) note that in the past, researchers have characterized these
two types of deterrence as operating on two separate populations: “specific deterrence affects the
punished offender, whereas general deterrence affects the unpunished would-be offender who
somehow witnesses or vicariously experiences punishment” (p. 3; also see Stafford & Warr,
1993). Over a decade ago, Stafford and Warr (1993) proposed a reconceptualization of
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deterrence in which both general and specific processes are married together. They claimed that
all persons could be affected by directly experiencing punishment (specific deterrence) as well as
by experiencing punishment indirectly when other persons are punished (general deterrence).
Although the traditional conception of general and specific deterrence is commonly
accepted by criminologists, Stafford and Warr (1993) present several shortcomings. One
shortcoming is the belief that general deterrence and specific deterrence impact different kinds of
individuals (either the general public or punished offenders). Both general and specific
deterrence are part of the deterrence process. However, general deterrence is focused on an
individual’s indirect experience with punishment while specific deterrence focuses on an
individual’s direct experience with punishment. Second, Stafford and Warr argue that the basic
conception of deterrence is concerned only with the effects of being punished. The potential
effects of avoiding punishment for a criminal behavior are overlooked. Stafford and Warr assert
that punishment avoidance may encourage criminal behavior more so than punishment does to
discourage crime. A third shortcoming of the traditional conception of separating specific from
general deterrence is the assumption that an individual offender’s direct experience with
punishment (i.e., specific deterrence) is the only influential variable when predicting future
behavior. However, offenders may not always experience punishment and often times engage in
more than one type of criminal activity. Surely, most individuals, including offenders, will have
some combination of direct and indirect experiences with legal punishment and experiences with
avoiding punishment.
To overcome these limitations, Stafford and Warr (1993, p. 127) recast general
deterrence as the “deterrent effect of indirect experience with punishment and punishment
avoidance” and specific deterrence as the “deterrent effect of direct experience with punishment
21

and punishment avoidance.” An individual’s direct and indirect experience with punishment will
increase his or her perception of the certainty, and perhaps severity, of punishment. In turn, these
experiences will decrease the likelihood of future offending. Conversely, direct and indirect
experiences with avoiding punishment will increase the individual’s future tendency to offend by
diminishing the perceived certainty of punishment.
Stafford and Warr (1993) observe several advantages to this reconceptualization. First,
redefining these concepts allows for general and specific deterrence to affect any individual in
any population. There is no longer an assumption that specific deterrence influences offenders
and general deterrence influences a completely different group of non-offenders. Therefore,
tendencies to offend are determined directly by one’s personal experiences or indirectly by one’s
vicarious experiences. Additionally, the relative affect of these experiences may not always be
equivalent (Paternoster & Piquero, 1995). Second, the experience of avoiding punishment is
considered to be a separate experience from that of being punished. Analytically, this distinction
is fundamental. As Stafford and Warr (1993, p. 125) assert, any criminal act will result either
with punishment or punishment avoidance, and “it is dubious to argue that only the former
impacts subsequent behavior.” Rather, avoiding formal sanctions conveys substantial
information about the perceived certainty of punishment. Stafford and Warr contend that one
other advantage to this model is its compatibility with learning theories. According to Bandura
(1977), experiential learning is attributable to the positive and negative effects of a specific
action, while observational or vicarious learning results from the observations of the errors and
achievements of others. Parallels may also apply to contemporary social learning paradigms
(e.g., Akers, 2001). As noted by Pratt et al. (2006), the cost-benefit analysis for engaging in
crime is affected by personal experiences or the modeling behavior of others.
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To summarize the perspective of Stafford and Warr (1993), the process of deterrence is
affected by four kinds of experience: direct experience with punishment, direct experience with
avoiding punishment, indirect experience with punishment, and indirect experience with
avoiding punishment. The integration of concepts from self-control and social learning theories
suggest that an individual’s cost-benefit analysis is influenced by other factors such as selfcontrol and other experiences as suggested by Stafford and Warr (1993; also see Pratt et al.,
2006). The next section provides an overview of the findings of deterrence research.

Empirical Status of Deterrence
Prior to 1980, there were two main types of deterrence research: interrupted time-series
and ecological studies. Interrupted time-series analyze the effects of specific punitive policy
interventions. Findings indicate that such interventions can have at least a temporary effect
(Sherman, 1990). Ecological studies estimate the deterrent effect by examining variations in
crime and sanction levels over time. Several studies have found deterrent effects (Sampson &
Cohen, 1988; Kagan, 1989; Levitt, 1996). Since 1980, perceptual studies have emerged as yet
another body of deterrence literature. Overall, the perceptual studies have found a negative
correlation between sanction risk perceptions and self-reported criminal behavior (Nagin, 1998).
The majority of interrupted time-series studies have observed the effect of police
crackdowns on illegal drug markets (Kleiman, 1986; Reuter, Haaga, Murhpy, & Praskac, 1988),
drunk driving (Ross, 1982), and disorderly behavior (Sherman, Roschelle, Gartin, Linnell, &
Coleman, 1986). Sherman (1990) and Ross (1982) have reviewed the literature on interrupted
time-series. These authors surmise that interventions are usually effective in creating an initial
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deterrent effect. For example, a decrease in fatalities involving a drunk driver would indicate an
initial deterrent effect of drunk-driving interventions. This initial effect is usually only
temporary, with a decline in the deterrent effect often beginning during the intervention itself.
Offenders who overestimate the certainty of getting caught at the beginning of the crackdown
later learn through trial and error or word or mouth that it is safe to offend again (Sherman,
1990). Thus, begins the decay of the deterrent effect.
Nagin (1998) analyzes two broad categories of ecological studies – the deterrent effect of
prison and of the police. The deterrent effect of prison considers the relationship between the
crime rate and the prison population, whether that is a direct relationship -- as crime increases,
the prison population subsequently increases -- or an inverse relationship – where increased
incarceration rates (which have both deterrent and incapacitation aspects) lead to lower crime.
The few studies that have been conducted demonstrate a range of findings, from a negligible
effect (Zimring & Hawkins, 1995) to Levitt’s (1996) finding that each additional prisoner
prevents approximately fifteen index crimes.
A larger body of ecological literature focuses on the police as a deterrent. Some of the
first ecological studies found deterrent effects between police resources or apprehension risk and
the crime rate (Wilson & Boland, 1978; Jacob & Rick, 1981). Continuing this line of research,
Sampson and Cohen (1988) also found strong evidence of the arrest ratio deterring crime. Nagin
(1998) analyzed several other studies (Marvell & Moody, 1996; Levitt, 1997) that reported a
negative relationship between officers per capita and index crimes.
In an avenue of research that complements these aggregate-level studies, scholars have
examined the empirical validity of deterrence theory at an individual level (Paternoster, 1987).
Importantly, theorists recognized that deterrent effects most likely depend on people’s
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perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment rather than on actual levels (Waldo &
Chiricos, 1972). The deterrence doctrine was restated as a perceptual process that proposed a
negative relationship between the perceived certainty and severity of punishment and
participation in criminal activity.
Paternoster (1987) examined twenty-seven studies in the published literature that have
reported tests on sanction risk perceptions and self-reported criminal/deviant behavior. The
majority of these studies consisted of cross-sectional bivariate correlations, indicating a negative
relationship between the perceived certainty of punishment and self-reported participation in
criminal/deviant acts. In keeping with the deterrence doctrine, this finding remained consistent
across different age and geographic samples, and across different operationalizations of
perceptions and behavior.
Paternoster (1987) notes two problems with most of the research examining the deterrent
effect of perceived punishment certainty. First is the problem of temporal order. Greenburg
(1981) suggests that perceptual deterrence research must establish that the cause (perceptions)
precedes the effect (criminal offending). He further adds that it is possible for perceptions to
represent a consequence rather than a cause of deviant behavior. For example, several studies
found that offenders had significantly lower estimates of punishment risk than non-offenders
(Claster, 1967; Jensen, 1969). This finding suggests that non-offenders may overestimate the
certainty of punishment. Once an individual engages in criminal behavior, however, perceptions
of being caught diminish. The effect of engaging in criminal behavior on perceptions of
punishment is known as the ‘experiential effect.’ This experiential effect detracts from the true
deterrent effect. Paternoster (1987) suspected that in the studies he reviewed, the cross-sectional
associations between sanction risk perceptions and criminal/deviant behavior that had been
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reported as deterrent effects actually represented experiential effects. To separate these two types
of effects, Paternoster examined the few perceptual deterrence studies that employed panel data.
The true deterrent effect for those studies using a panel design was substantially weaker than
those employing cross-sectional designs.
The second problem addressed by Paternoster (1987) is that of model misspecification, or
controlling for the influences of other exogenous variables on the dependent variable. The
inverse relationship between perceptions of punishment and criminal behavior may be caused by
some other variable excluded from the causal model. Paternoster examined twelve studies that
analyzed the deterrent effect of perceived certainty in more fully developed causal models. As a
result of controlling for other exogenous variables, support for deterrence again diminished. The
expected relationship between perceived certainty and criminal behavior was statistically
significant in only two of the eight studies. Support for deterrence decreased further when
multivariate tests and longitudinal models were employed. Paternoster’s (1987) review of the
literature suggests that support for the deterrence doctrine is greatest for those studies that are
methodologically weakest – those studies that utilized cross-sectional designs and those with few
controls for other exogenous variables.
Unlike the perceived certainty of punishment, the perceived severity of punishment has
received less attention in deterrence research. Paternoster (1987) cites three reasons for this lack
of attention to sanction severity. First, theorists have emphasized the certainty of punishment
over the severity of punishment. This emphasis can be traced back to the founders of classical
criminology (Beccaria, 1764). Second, after much investigation, researchers using aggregate
level data found no consistent inverse relationships between punishment severity and crime rates.
Thus, there was no aggregate-level relationship for researchers to seek to confirm or refute at the
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individual level. Third, early perceptual deterrence researchers were also unable to find an
inverse relationship between punishment severity and crime rates. The few studies that have been
conducted reveal a weak relationship, if any, between perceived severity and criminal/deviant
behavior, offering little support to the deterrence doctrine and little incentive to investigate this
aspect of the theory further.
Pratt et al. (2006) build on Paternoster’s (1987) review of perceptual deterrence research
with a meta-analysis. Pratt et al. examine the literature in an attempt to ascertain the overall
magnitude of the connection between deterrence variables and crime as well as focusing on the
effect research methods and statistical analyses have on the support for deterrence theory. Pratt
et al. examined the effect sizes of 40 empirical studies. These effect size estimates were
compared weighted and unweighted, and divided into four predictor groups assumed to have
different effects on the likelihood of offending. Effect size estimates were weighted due to
variations in sample size, statistical interdependencies, or unobserved heterogeneity across
studies. The four predictor domains included the certainty of punishment, the severity of
punishment, deterrence theory composites, and the threat of non-legal sanctions, thereby
including elements of rational choice.
Pratt et al. (2006) present two main conclusions associated with the effect size estimate
findings. First, none of the weighting procedures significantly influenced the mean effect size
estimates. Second, regardless of whether weighted or unweighted effect size estimates were
examined, support for deterrence was relatively weak. This was particularly true for assessments
of perceived severity and composite measures of deterrence. Effects were stronger for perceived
certainty and for non-legal sanctions though these effects were still quite modest. The overall
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effect size estimates weighted for sample size were -0.334 for perceived certainty and -0.177 for
non-legal sanctions.
In addition to examining overall effect sizes, Pratt et al. also explored the impact of
methodological variations on deterrence predictors. Consistent with Paternoster’s (1987) study,
Pratt et al. found substantial reductions in the mean effect size estimates of deterrence variables
on crime from statistical expansions (bivariate to multivariate models). The mean effect size for
the certainty predictors declined by 69% in those multivariate models that controlled for
experiential effects or for variables from competing theories. Some differences were also
observed across sample specifications. The strongest effects were found in those studies that
used young adult or college-aged samples, and weaker effects were revealed by studies of the
general population and of samples of offenders. Finally, Pratt et al. found that mean effect sizes
were the strongest in those studies that examined organizational offending as their dependent
variable. Weaker effects were produced for violent, property, drug, and alcohol-related
criminality.

Empirical Tests of Stafford and Warr’s Reconceptualization
Thus far, five studies have analyzed Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization of
general and specific deterrence. These studies are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, and this
dissertation discusses key aspects of their methods and findings below. In the earliest analysis,
Paternoster and Piquero (1995) assessed Stafford and Warr’s reconceptualization using data from
a longitudinal study of underage drinking and marijuana use. The data, originally collected from
high school students in a southeastern city in 1981 and 1982, did contain measures of several
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salient variables. Direct experience, termed “personal experience” by Paternoster and Piquero
(1995, p. 253), with punishment was based on the participants’ accounts of contact with the
criminal justice system. Personal experience with avoiding punishment was calculated by
subtracting the number of times the participant had been caught for smoking marijuana or
drinking alcohol from the number of times he or she had engaged in these behaviors in the
previous year. Unfortunately, indirect experience, or in Paternoster and Piquero’s (1995, p. 253)
terminology “vicarious experience,” could be assessed with only a single item. The item asked
for the proportion of each participant’s friends who used marijuana or alcohol, but no data were
gathered on whether they had been caught or punished. Therefore, vicarious experiences with
punishment could not be separated from vicarious experiences with avoiding punishment, a
notable limitation of this test.
To measure perceived sanction certainty, Paternoster and Piquero (1995) employed the
respondents’ 1981 estimates of how likely they would be to get apprehended by the police if they
engaged in marijuana use and underage drinking. Criminal behavior was measured in the 1982
survey through participants’ accounts of the number of times they had drank alcohol and used
marijuana during the previous year.
Paternoster and Piquero (1995) were able to substantiate several of Stafford and Warr’s
(1993) propositions. The combination of both personal (specific deterrence) and vicarious
(general deterrence) experiences influenced participants’ perceived risk of punishment for
smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol. Contrary to Stafford and Warr’s model, however, the
findings showed a positive relationship between personal punishment experiences and
subsequent substance use.
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The second test of Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization of general and specific
deterrence was also performed by Piquero and Paternoster (1998). In this piece, Piquero and
Paternoster applied Stafford and Warr’s theory to a secondary data set assessing drinking and
driving. Snortum and Berger (1989) conducted a 62-item national telephone survey of licensed
drivers in 1986. Because the questionnaire was not specifically intended to assess Stafford and
Warr’s model, however, Piquero and Paternoster (1998, p. 6) “were forced to use what [they]
think are close proxies of key theoretical constructs.” For example, the measures of personal
punishment experience were less than ideal because few participants had been punished for
drinking and driving. Only 14 percent had been pulled over at a DUI checkpoint, and only two
percent reported having been arrested. The former item is also problematic because an individual
may be pulled over at a checkpoint when they have not been drinking, or a drinking driver may
be pulled over but not arrested which would represent punishment avoidance.
Still, Piquero and Paternoster (1998) were able to examine Stafford and Warr’s (1993)
reconceptualization more comprehensively than they had in their 1995 study with the inclusion
of separate measures of vicarious punishment and vicarious punishment avoidance experiences.
Vicarious experience with punishment was assessed by participants’ reports of whether they
knew anyone who had been apprehended for driving while intoxicated, who had their driver’s
license suspended for driving while intoxicated, or who had been incarcerated for driving while
intoxicated within the previous twelve months. Vicarious punishment avoidance was assessed by
participants’ estimates of how many people who are convicted of drinking and driving actually
receive the appropriate punishment. Other items measured the participants’ perceived severity
and certainty of punishment.
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Table 1 Reconceptualization of Deterrence Studies: Correlates of the Likelihood of Offending

Author
Sitren and Applegate (2006)
Sitren and Applegate (2007)
Piquero and Pogarsky (2002)
Piquero and Paternoster (1998)
Paternoster and Piquero (1995)

Author
Sitren and Applegate (2006)
Sitren and Applegate (2007)
Piquero and Pogarsky (2002)
Piquero and Paternoster (1998)
Paternoster and Piquero (1995)

Author
Sitren and Applegate (2006)
Sitren and Applegate (2007)
Piquero and Pogarsky (2002)
Piquero and Paternoster (1998)
Paternoster and Piquero (1995)

DV
Student cheating
Drunk driving
Drunk driving
Drunk driving
Underage drinking
and marijuana use

Vicarious
PunishmentOthers
*
ns
*
*
*
Pulled
Over
*
*
ns
*
*

Sample
College students
College students
College students
Licensed drivers
High school students

Personal
Punishment
Experience
ns
+
ns
+
+

Personal
Punishment
Avoidance
+
+
ns
+
+

Vicarious
Punishment
Experience
ns
ns
+
+
*

Vicarious
Punishment
Avoidance
+
+
+
*

Vicarious
Punishment
AvoidanceOthers
*
ns
*
*
*

Prior Illicit
Behaviors
ns
ns
*
*

Vicarious
Prior Illicit
Behaviors
ns
+
*
*
*

Certainty of
Punishment
ns
ns
-

Certainty of
Punishment
Others
*
*
*
ns
ns

Severity of
Punishment
*
*

Impulsivity
ns
+
ns
*
*

Drinking
*
ns
ns
*
*

Moral
Evaluation
ns
*
-

Chance of
Shame
ns
*
*
*

Severity of
Shame
ns
ns
*
*
*

Fun
+
+
*
*
*

Informal
Sanctions
*
*
*
ns
*

Peer DV
Behavior
*
*
*
+
+
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Author
Sitren and Applegate (2006)
Sitren and Applegate (2007)
Piquero and Pogarsky (2002)
Piquero and Paternoster (1998)
Paternoster and Piquero (1995)
+
ns
*

Peer
Attitudes
Toward DV
*
*
*
+
*

Social
Support
ns
*
*
-

Parental
Supervision
*
*
*
*
-

Age
ns
ns
ns
*
*

Gender
(males)
ns
+
ns
ns
*

Income
ns
ns
ns
*
*

Traffic
Accident
*
ns
ns
*
*

significant positive relationship (p ≤ 0.05)
significant negative relationship (p ≤ 0.05)
relationship not significant
variable was not included or results not reported in the study

Note: Results summarized here are based on the most rigorous multivariate tests reported by the author(s) of each study.
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GPA
ns
*
*
*
*

Academic
Standing
ns
*
*
*
*

Another
University
ns
*
*
*
*

Table 2 Reconceptualization of Deterrence Studies: Correlates of Perceived Certainty of Punishment

Author
Sitren and Applegate (2006)
Sitren and Applegate (2007)
Piquero and Pogarsky (2002)
Piquero and Paternoster (1998)
Paternoster and Piquero (1995)

Author
Sitren and Applegate (2006)
Sitren and Applegate (2007)
Piquero and Pogarsky (2002)
Piquero and Paternoster (1998)
Paternoster and Piquero (1995)

Author
Sitren and Applegate (2006)
Sitren and Applegate (2007)
Piquero and Pogarsky (2002)
Piquero and Paternoster (1998)
Paternoster and Piquero (1995)
+
ns
*

Personal
Punishment
Sample
Experience
College students
ns
College students
ns
College students
ns
Licensed drivers
ns
High school students
-

DV
Student cheating
Drunk driving
Drunk driving
Drunk driving
Underage drinking
and marijuana use
Vicarious
Vicarious
Punishment
Punishment- AvoidanceOthers
Others
*
*
+
ns
*
*
*
*
*
*
Informal
Sanctions
*
*
*
+
*

Peer DV
Behavior
*
*
*
ns
-

Severity of
Punishment
ns
ns
*
*
*

Prior Illicit
Behaviors
*
*
ns
*
*

Peer
Attitudes
Toward DV
*
*
*
ns
ns

Social
Support
*
*
*
*
+

Pulled
Over
*
*
ns
*
*
Parental
Supervision
*
*
*
*
+

Personal
Punishment
Avoidance
ns
ns
ns

Drinking
*
*
ns
*
*

Vicarious
Punishment
Avoidance
+
*

Certainty of
PunishmentMoral
Impulsivity
Others
Evaluation
*
*
*
*
*
*
ns
*
*
*
+
+
*
+
+

Age
*
*
ns
*
*

significant positive relationship (p ≤ 0.05)
significant negative relationship (p ≤ 0.05)
relationship not significant
variable was not included or results not reported in the study

Note: Results summarized here are based on the most rigorous multivariate tests reported by the author(s) of each study.
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Vicarious
Punishment
Experience
ns
ns
ns
ns
*

Gender
(males)
*
*
*
*

Income
*
*
ns
*
*

Traffic
Accident
*
*
ns
*
*

Piquero and Paternoster (1998) found that a participant’s level of agreement that he or
she would in all likelihood drive while under the influence at least once in the next year was
influenced by both personal and vicarious experiences. Consistent with Stafford and Warr’s
(1993) restatement, findings suggested that personally avoiding punishment encouraged future
offending. Other results, however, were contrary to Stafford and Warr’s (1993) propositions.
Having been stopped at a DUI checkpoint and knowing someone who had been apprehended,
incarcerated, or had his or her drivers license suspended – ostensibly measures of personal and
vicarious punishment – both increased reported intentions to offend.
In a subsequent analysis of Stafford and Warr’s (1993) model, Piquero and Pogarsky
(2002) recognized the limitations in the previous two studies. Rather than utilizing secondary
data, Piquero and Pogarsky (2002) designed a research study specifically to test Stafford and
Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization. The researchers recruited 250 students from a large,
southwestern U.S. university. Participants were asked to complete a survey containing a
hypothetical scenario in which each student had to make a decision about offending. Piquero and
Pogarsky (2002) included separate measures of personal experience with punishment, personal
experiences with avoiding punishment, vicarious experiences with punishment, and vicarious
experiences with avoiding punishment. In addition, Piquero and Pogarsky (2002) assessed the
role of impulsivity on offending behavior. The researchers predicted that impulsive individuals
would be more likely to depend on personal experiences than vicarious ones.
Concerning drinking and driving, Piquero and Pogarsky (2002) corroborate some features
of Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization of general and specific deterrence. Consistent
with the model’s predictions, personal experiences with avoiding punishment reduce perceptions
of risk and increase future offending. Vicarious experiences with avoiding punishment also
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reduced participants’ estimates of the certainty of punishment and increased the likelihood of
future offending. Contrary to deterrence theory, vicarious experiences with punishment,
however, were negatively related to perceived sanction risk. Piquero and Pogarksy’s results also
found evidence in support of other predictors of offending. Impulsivity decreased respondents’
perceived certainty of punishment.
Two final studies offered a replication and extension of Piquero and Pogarsky’s 2002
study. Sitren and Applegate (2006, 2007) replicated Piquero and Pogarsky’s technique using a
larger sample from a different region of the country. Sitren and Applegate recruited 860
undergraduate students from a large, southeastern U.S. university. Both studies extended the
literature by including several salient variables not previously considered in this context. Sitren
and Applegate (2006, 2007) examined the effect of extralegal costs and benefits on offending,
explored the probability that variation in social support influence offending intentions, and
assessed general deterrence experiences in a more extensive way than in prior research.
Additionally, Sitren and Applegate (2006) examined a different type of behavior. While the
previous four studies analyzed some form of drinking behavior (drinking and driving or
underage drinking), Sitren and Applegate (2006) evaluated student test cheating.
Similar to those of the previous investigations in this area, Sitren and Applegate’s (2007)
results provide only partial support for Stafford and Warr’s (1993) conception of deterrence.
Consistent with the reconceptualization, experiences with evading punishment increased an
individual’s likelihood of offending by reducing perceived risk of punishment. Additionally,
perceived sanction risks and the probability of future offending were determined not only
directly by personal experiences, but also indirectly through the punishment avoidance
experiences of others. Results also confirm the prediction that experiences of close
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acquaintances are more influential than those who are outside an individual’s social circle
(Stafford & Warr, 1993; Piquero & Pogarsky, 2002).
The findings for punishment experiences were more complex and did not always agree
with expectations from deterrence theory. Sitren and Applegate (2007) observed that higher
estimates for how often respondents’ thought the police made DUI stops for those known
personally increased the perceived punishment risk. Moreover, vicarious punishment experiences
for those not personally known by the participant were the strongest predictor for perceived
certainty of punishment.
Personal punishment experience was positively correlated to intentions to drive while
intoxicated. This result is inconsistent with Stafford and Warr’s (1993) restatement – and with
any component of deterrence theory – which predicts a negative association between punishment
and future criminal behavior.1 As reported above, however, other studies also have found a
positive relationship between measures of previous punishment experience and offending. Sitren
and Applegate (2007) replicated Piquero and Pogarsky’s (2002) observation that impulsivity is
influential to offending decision-making. In addition, results demonstrate the importance of
extralegal sanctions to perceptual deterrence research (Nagin, 1978; Pratt et al., 2006). Sitren and
Applegate (2007) reported significant relationships between the amount of fun, chance of shame,
and moral wrongfulness with future propensities to offend.

1

Of course, other theoretical perspectives predict a positive correlation between punishment and future
offending (Lemert, 1979) or identify specific situations in which punishment encourages rather than
discourages perpetual criminality (Braithwaite, 1989).
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In the study that examined students’ intentions to cheat on an exam, Sitren and Applegate
(2006) again found relationships that were partially supportive and partially not supportive of
Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization. As predicted by the reconceptualization, the
perceived certainty of punishment significantly decreased with greater vicarious punishment
avoidance experiences. Additionally, both personal and vicarious experiences with punishment
avoidance had positive and statistically significant effects on intentions to cheat on a college test.
The experimental manipulation of punishment severity significantly influenced an individual’s
decision to offend.
Contrary to Stafford and Warr’s (1993) conception, both personal and vicarious
punishment experiences did not affect an individual’s perceived risk of punishment. In addition,
results suggested that punishment severity was not related to punishment certainty. More
noteworthy, both personal and vicarious punishment experiences were not related to future
offending. Several additional observations were less directly related to the deterrence framework
but are worth mentioning. Respondents who had lower levels of social support reported higher
intentions of offending. Sitren and Applegate (2006) also found one extralegal consideration that
influenced participants’ propensity to engage in illegal activity: the amount of fun associated
with the illegal behavior.
In sum, the existing studies partially confirm Stafford and Warr’s (1993)
reconceptualization, but they also raise some questions and suggest the need to move beyond
deterrence variables to explain criminal behavior.
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Limitations of Existing Deterrence Research
Reviews of deterrence research have found studies in support of the deterrence doctrine.
While Nagin’s (1998) assessment of deterrence research observed substantially more evidence
for a deterrent effect among contemporary studies compared to those conducted in the 1970s,
Paternoster (1987) and Pratt et al. (2006) suggest weaker findings in studies that have employed
more rigorous statistical analyses. The few studies that have been conducted to test Stafford and
Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization of deterrence specifically demonstrate support for some key
features of the model. However, previous deterrence research is not without its limitations.
Research examining the relationship between the deterrent effect of sanction threats and criminal
propensity have typically relied on student samples, relatively minor offending, minimal
integration of extralegal costs and benefits, and bivariate statistical analyses. Therefore, four
significant limitations characterize the empirical literature on deterrence.
First, deterrence researchers have focused on conventional populations. Deterrence
theory has been tested in only limited ways with experienced offenders. According to Pogarsky
et al. (2005), evidence suggests that offenders may have unique decision-making processes for
different types of crimes. Pogarsky et al. (2005) examined data from the National Youth Survey
to investigate how sanction risk perceptions are formed and modified. In two instances, the
influences of perceptions of certainty and moral inhibitions differed for different types of crime.
Nagin and Pogarsky (2004) also found differing considerations for future consequences when
comparing property and violent crimes. These results add to the increasing collection of evidence
that decision-making processes differ by crime type (Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Paternoster,
1989). Although perceptual deterrence research has advanced from bivariate correlations to
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multivariate models, the majority of the studies have been conducted on student samples and
have assessed minor deviant behaviors (Paternoster, 1987). Tests of Stafford and Warr’s
restatement have only examined college students (Piquero & Pogarsky, 2002; Sitren &
Applegate, 2006, 2007), licensed drivers (Piquero & Paternoster, 1998), and high school students
(Paternoster & Piquero, 1995). Pratt et al. (2006) note a pattern of deterrence support found
among studies that draw on college students’ self-reported intentions to offend based on
hypothetical scenarios or vignettes that may be less pronounced among offender samples.
Several criminologists argue that offenders may be different than those typically studied
in deterrence research (Piliavian et al., 1986; Decker et al., 1993). Wright, Caspi, Moffitt, and
Paternoster (2004) observe, for example, that samples of university students may not provide
adequate variation in criminal propensity to fully measure the interaction between deterrence
variables and likelihood of offending. Furthermore, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) contend that
criminally prone individuals are more impulsive, risk-taking, and present-oriented in nature. This
impulsivity facilitates the criminally prone to neglect long-term consequences and instead focus
on the immediate benefits of their behavior. Thus, threatened punishments for crime may deter
criminally prone individuals less than others.
Criminally prone individuals may also have much less to lose through formal and
informal sanctions when compared to conventional individuals (Wright et al., 2004). Individuals
with a higher likelihood of offending often have a difficult time establishing long-term
relationships, continuing with educational training, and/or committing themselves to long-term
career goals (Wright et al., 2004). Additionally, Block and Gerety (1995) found that offenders
are more risk seeking and thus, are less deterrable with increases in punishment certainty.
Moreover, offenders’ perceptions may be more resistant to change. Bridges and Stone (1986)
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found that experiences with crime and punishments had little effect on offenders’ perceptions of
threat. In an examination of several high-risk populations, Piliavin et al. (1986) found that
neither formal sanctions nor the risk of loosing a spouse or friend if imprisoned acted as a
deterrent to criminal behavior. Therefore, the salient deterrents may be very different for
offending populations (Piliavin et al., 1986; Decker et al., 1993).
The second limitation of the empirical literature on deterrence is the concentration on a
narrow set of offenses, especially nonserious criminal acts (Paternoster, 1987). As previously
discussed, individual-level analyses of deterrence have largely sampled students in high schools
or colleges (Chiricos & Waldo, 1970; Jensen, Gibbs, & Erickson, 1978; Paternoster, 1983) or
sampled geographically limited populations (Meier & Johnson, 1977; Grasmick & Green 1980;
Tittle, 1980). As a result, because serious crimes are uncommon in these populations, researchers
have used as dependent variables non-serious forms of deviant behavior, such as marijuana use,
petty theft, and alcohol abuse (Piliavin et al., 1986). In particular, studies that have tested
Stafford and Warr’s (1993) restatement also have examined only a limited number of offenses –
drinking and driving, underage drinking, marijuana use, and student test cheating. These
behaviors threaten the principles of some groups of individuals but not others. Therefore,
findings of these studies may be suggestive of informal controls to specific groups. Of great
importance is determining the explanatory power of a deterrence model on a broader range of
offenses (Piliavin et al., 1986).
Prior tests of Stafford and Warr’s (1993) conception all took an offense-specific approach
to testing the deterrent effects of punishment and punishment avoidance (Paternoster & Piquero,
1995; Piquero & Paternoster, 1998; Piquero & Pogarsky, 2002; Sitren & Applegate, 2006, 2007).
Research shows that most offenders do not “specialize”, committing more than one type of
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offense (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Moffitt, 1993). Furthermore, experiences with punishment
and punishment avoidance for one type of misbehavior may spill over to other areas of
offending.
A third limitation has been the lack of attention to the extralegal costs and benefits of the
decision-making process. According to Paternoster (1989), perceptual deterrence researchers
have rarely integrated their tests into an overall model of social control. Even though the threat
of informal sanctions and moral condemnation of acts have been included in some analyses, the
importance of these variables has not been properly articulated. Grasmick and Bursik (1990)
identify two extralegal sources of conformity: embarrassment and shame. The embarrassment of
the legal sanction stems from disapproval from persons with important connections to the
offender (e.g., friends, spouses, family). An offender may experience the feeling of shame after
committing a criminal act if the act violates the offender’s internalized behavioral norms. Several
studies examining non-legal consequences have found that a moral belief that the behavior is
wrong (Foglia, 1997; Paternoster & Simpson, 1996), and the fear of peer disapproval or
embarrassment (Tittle, 1980; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Nagin & Paternoster, 1994) discourages
criminal behavior.
Additionally, in a survey of high school students, Paternoster (1989) analyzed the
influence of affective ties, material considerations, opportunities, informal sanctions, formal
sanctions, and moral considerations on one’s decision to offend. He found considerable support
for examining the effect of non-legal considerations of offending decisions. Several other studies
have also noted the importance of examining the extralegal costs associated with being
apprehended for a crime (Nagin, 1998; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). In fact, the deterrent effect of
extralegal sanctions may be as great a deterrent as legal sanctions. These considerations are part
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and parcel of a rational choice perspective and Stafford and Warr’s (1993) model may also
benefit from their integration.
Variations in rewards and risks have yet to be introduced to tests of Stafford and Warr’s
(1993) reconceptualization of deterrence. In the first study designed specifically to test Stafford
and Warr’s (1993) theory, Piquero and Pogarksy (2002) used one measure of personal
punishment (i.e., being stopped by the police). The authors recommend the examination of
several other forms of punishment, such as arrest, court procedure, conviction, and incarceration.
Furthermore, the risk of punishment was not varied in previous tests of Stafford and Warr’s
reconceptualization. Perceived punishment risk is highly salient to offending decisions. It is
argued that offenders’ perceptions of punishment severity and risk are quite different than nonoffenders. Inexperienced offenders are more likely to fear punishment than experienced ones
(Bridges & Stone, 1986). Novice offenders have less information on which to base their
decisions and sanction risk perceptions. Consequently, such perceptions may change
dramatically with initial experiences with the criminal justice system. In contrast, experienced
offenders have more accurate risk and severity punishment perceptions. As such, these
perceptions are less easily influenced. A study that systematically varies the certainty of
punishment would allow these possibilities to be examined empirically.
The fourth limitation characterizing much of the empirical literature on deterrence is the
failure to establish temporal ordering of sanctions and crime consistent with their theoretical
ordering. Most analyses of individual-level deterrence have relied mainly on bivariate
relationships. Inferring causality is difficult not only for cross-sectional studies but also for
individual-level studies of deterrence for two reasons. First, the causal ordering between
independent and dependent variables contradicts their temporal ordering. Any criminal behavior
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committed prior to an interview is characterized as a function of attitudes. This type of design,
however, is unable to determine whether observed negative relationships are the result of the
impact of crime on perceived risks. Second, because information on independent and dependent
variables are collected at the same time, contamination effects cannot be ruled out. For example,
a respondent’s reports on one set of variables may influence responses on others (Piliavin et al.,
1986). Still, cross-sectional, individual-level studies can provide robust tests when researchers
attend to the issue of causal ordering.
In sum, Paternoster (1987) suggests that survey research of high-criminality among an
adult sample would further perceptual deterrence research. Furthermore, Piquero and Pogarsky
(2002) note the importance of examining offenders so as to separate the influence of personal or
vicarious experiences or both. Integrating experienced offenders in tests of deterrence theory
would also allow expansion of the range of offenses to include more serious crimes. In order to
understand criminal decision-making, Nagin and Pogarsky (2001) note the importance of
integrating alternative sanction forms with deterrence theory. And finally, establishing causal
ordering of sanctions and crime consistent with their temporal ordering would prove to further
the empirical literature on deterrence (Piliavin et al., 1986).

The Current Study
Although the literature examining general and specific deterrence separately is extensive
(Nagin, 1998), only the five studies reviewed here have examined Stafford and Warr’s (1993)
propositions about a combined model. While the first two tests of Stafford and Warr’s (1993)
theory employed secondary data (Paternoster & Piquero, 1995; Piquero & Paternoster, 1998),
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subsequent analyses utilized original data designed to test the key constructs of Stafford and
Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization (Piquero & Pogarsky, 2002; Sitren & Applegate, 2006, 2007).
The current study offers a replication and extension of these pieces. This study replicates Piquero
and Pogarsky’s vignette approach but uses a sample of offenders. It also extends the literature by
incorporating several concepts not previously considered in this context. This dissertation will
evaluate the impact of extralegal costs and benefits of offending, measure general deterrence
experiences in a more extensive manner than in prior research, and expand the range of
offending behaviors. In any event, this study seeks to test the core predictions presented by
Stafford and Warr: (H1) personal and vicarious experiences with punishment will decrease the
likelihood of future offending by increasing the perceived certainty of punishment; and (H2)
conversely, personal and vicarious experiences with punishment avoidance will decrease an
individual’s perception of the certainty of punishment, thereby increasing an individual’s future
tendency to offend. Finally, this dissertation will provide beginning evidence on the question of
whether Stafford and Warr’s (1993) model should be expanded to include extra-legal
considerations drawn from rational choice theory. The next chapter presents the research
methodology for this study, including a description of the sample, procedures, and measurement
of variables.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

Sample
Work release inmates were recruited from Orange County, FL. Respondents were asked
to complete a written questionnaire. Participation was anonymous and voluntary. Offenders were
selected as the subject population for two reasons. First, there is a lack of evidence about known
offenders in the area of perceptual deterrence research (Paternoster, 1987). Second, several
studies have shown that it is possible to examine perceptual deterrence among active offenders
(Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Decker et al., 1993).
This project requested participation from all available Orange County work release
inmates, continuing until 300 participants were obtained. Orange County work release inmates
are confined and almost always sentenced, with little or no history of violence. The Orange
County Work Release Center (WRC) has a capacity of 308 inmates. At the beginning of data
collection, there were approximately 150 males and 40 females residing at WRC. Both males and
females were surveyed. Because some inmates choose not to participate and WRC only had
approximately 200 inmates at any one time, data collection continued for several months until
the desired 300 responses were obtained. The total number of surveys collected was 326. The
recruitment of 326 work release inmates produces estimated power of 0.986, with a medium
effect size, 95% confidence interval, and 33 indicators.
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Procedures
Work release inmates are confined at the facility for all times other than when they are
working or receive a 12-hour furlough for good behavior. Surveys were administered to inmates
in a confined area, an available room designated by the administrative sergeant. The survey took
approximately 20-30 minutes to complete. Those 200 inmates who resided at WRC were
surveyed in groups of approximately 40. Once the initial population of 200 inmates was
surveyed, the researcher went on a weekly basis to survey inmates newly admitted to WRC.
Each week, anywhere between 7 and 20 inmates entered WRC. The facility kept a list of all
inmates and called those individuals who needed to complete the survey. WRC tracked those
inmates who had already been surveyed so as not to duplicate respondents. Orange County WRC
employees were the only persons to have access to the list of inmate names; thus, the survey
remained anonymous. According to the administrative sergeant, administering surveys in smaller
groups had the lowest negative effect on facility operations.
Respondents were asked to complete a written questionnaire containing three
hypothetical scenarios in which the participant had to decide whether or not to offend in a
particular situation. The offenses addressed in the scenarios were driving under the influence,
drug abuse, and larceny-theft. The survey topics and subject population were chosen because
they came together in a way particularly useful for testing Stafford and Warr’s (1993)
reconceptualization. First, driving under the influence, drug abuse, and larceny-theft are all
relatively common offenses. According to the Uniform Crime Reports (2006), approximately 4.5
million individuals were arrested for these offenses, representing nearly one third of all total
arrests made in 2005. Second, in order to produce meaningful survey responses, participants
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must have adequate familiarity with the chosen behaviors. The majority of inmates at WRC are
typically incarcerated for nonviolent offenses, such as property crimes, drug abuse violations,
and motor vehicle violations. Therefore, participants should have enough knowledge and
experience with these offenses to answer personal questions about themselves and vicarious
questions about other people’s behavior. More specifically, these scenarios addressed driving
under the influence of alcohol, illegal drug purchase, and shoplifting. All three are relatively
minor offenses in which respondents would have adequate familiarity with the selected
behaviors. Additionally, these three offenses lent themselves nicely to the creation of realistic
hypothetical scenarios.
Three hypothetical scenarios were developed to test the key elements of Stafford and
Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization by placing respondents in a situation where they had to make
a decision about offending. The first scenario, driving under the influence of alcohol, was
designed by Piquero and Pogarsky (2002, pp. 161-162) and also utilized in several other studies
(Pogarsky, 2002; Pogarsky & Piquero, 2003; Sitren & Applegate, 2007):
Suppose you drove by yourself one evening to meet some friends in a local bar. By the
end of the evening, you’ve had enough drinks so that you’re pretty sure your blood
alcohol level is above the legal limit. Suppose that you live about 10 miles away and you
have to be at work early the next morning. You can either drive home or find some other
way home, but if you leave your car at the bar, you will have to return early the next
morning to pick it up.
The second scenario, illegal drug purchase, was as follows:
Suppose you know another work release inmate who has drugs for sale, including
marijuana, crack, heroin, and some prescription medications. You know that drugs are
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not allowed in work release, but they could make your time go by with fewer worries.
You have the money to buy whatever you want.
The third scenario, shoplifting, was modified from one created by Tibbetts (1997, pp. 249-250).
Suppose it is Sunday evening, and you have gone to a small, privately owned
convenience store to buy some cold medicine. The past few days, you have been feeling
sick and have not been sleeping well. You think the cold medicine will help you get some
sleep before a big meeting the next morning. The store is about to close when you realize
that you do not have enough money to buy the cold medicine. The medicine is small
enough to hide on you without anyone noticing. You do have enough money to buy a
soda so that no one will be suspicious of you not buying anything. You notice that you
are out of sight from the only clerk, who is reading the newspaper behind the counter, and
there seem to be no video cameras or other types of security devices in the store.
It is possible that certain respondents would find it difficult to picture themselves in these
situations. If this were the case, the validity of the scenario to assess their intention to offend
would be diminished. Therefore, after each scenario, the respondents were asked to assess its
realism. Specifically, they were asked to rate on a scale of 0 to 100 how realistic it is that they
would find themselves in the situation described. Also following each scenario, the survey asked
respondents to complete several judgment questions about the situation, general questions about
the illegal behavior (driving under the influence, drug abuse, or larceny-theft), and additional
items intended to measure possible interaction and control variables.
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Measurement of Variables
As previously noted, this dissertation replicated and extended Piquero and Pogarsky’s
(2002) piece. In this respect, the current study replicated their measures of the key constructs in
Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization of general and specific deterrence: Likelihood of
offending, personal and vicarious experiences with punishment and punishment avoidance,
perceived certainty of punishment, and punishment severity. Appendix A provides a summary of
the operationalization of all study variables. Below, this project describes the dependent variable
– likelihood of offending – and each group of independent variables – personal experience,
vicarious experience, punishment certainty, punishment severity, extralegal costs and benefits,
impulsivity, religiosity, and other controls.

Likelihood of Offending
To measure the dependent variable in the deterrence framework, the respondents
estimated the likelihood that they would drive drunk, purchase illegal drugs, and shoplift under
the circumstances described in each scenario (on a scale of 0 to 100). A nondichotomous
technique for the operationalization of the dependent variable allowed participants to concede
some uncertainty in the decision to offend. Other factors not included in the vignette, such as
efforts to “save face” (Gusfield, Rasmussen, & Kotaraba, 1984), may influence an individual’s
decision to drink and drive, purchase illegal drugs, and steal. Therefore, this approach allowed
participants the chance to state “it depends” while providing a concrete answer.
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Personal Experience
Personal experiences were measured by asking respondents to report their experiences
with punishment and punishment avoidance for the three offenses corresponding to those in the
hypothetical scenarios -- drunk driving, illegal drug purchase, and shoplifting. Personal
punishment experience for the drunk driving scenario was defined as the number of times the
participant has been arrested by the police when their blood alcohol level was above the legal
limit. This study also asked participants to report the number of times that they have previously
driven when they suspected that their blood alcohol level was above the legal limit. Therefore,
personal punishment avoidance was calculated by subtracting the number of times inmates have
been previously arrested by the police for driving under the influence from the number of times
they have driven while intoxicated.
Similarly, personal punishment experience for the drug purchase scenario was defined as
the number of times the participant has been arrested for buying drugs illegally. Participants
were also asked to report the number of times they have previously purchased illegal drugs.
Therefore, personal punishment avoidance was calculated by subtracting the number of times
inmates have been previously arrested for buying drugs illegally from the number of times they
have previously purchased illegal drugs.
Personal punishment experience for the shoplifting scenario was defined as the number of
times the participant has been arrested for taking something from a store without paying for it.
Participants were also asked to report the number of times they have taken something from a
store without paying for it. Therefore, personal punishment avoidance was calculated by
subtracting the number of times inmates have been previously arrested for taking something
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from a store without paying for it from the number of times they have taken something from a
store without paying for it.
Other potential influences on how people interpret the certainty of punishment may
include their experiences with other crimes. That is, deterrence may generalize from one
situation to another, where punishment for one offense may discourage someone from
committing a different illegal act (Piquero & Pogarsky, 2002). Previous studies testing Stafford
and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization have measured prior illegal offending but have not been
able to separate measures of punishment and measures of punishment avoidance – a central
dimension to the theory currently being tested. Therefore, this dissertation also asked
respondents to report their experiences with punishment and punishment avoidance with several
other crimes including car theft, vandalism, burglary, public disturbance, assault, driving without
a license, and whether respondents have started a fistfight. Again, to separate punishment
avoidance experiences, the number of times an inmate had been arrested was subtracted from the
number of times he or she had committed the offense in question.
Thus, for each scenario there are four indices of personal or direct experience. Offensespecific indices captured each respondent’s experiences with punishment and punishment
avoidance for the crime described in the instant vignette. Below, these are labeled “Personal
Punishment [offense]” and “Personal Punishment Avoidance [offense]”, respectively. To assess
personal experience with punishment for other crimes, “Personal Punishment (other crimes)”,
indices were calculated by adding the number of times respondents had been arrested in the
previous five years for driving a car without the owner’s permission; vandalizing someone’s
property; breaking into house or building; acting loud, rowdy, or unruly in a public place; hurting
or threatening to hurt someone with a weapon; driving without a license; starting a fistfight; and
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the two offenses from the vignettes not currently under consideration. For example, the personal
punishment index for the drunk driving scenario included the sum of arrests for all the crimes
listed above plus buying illegal drugs and shoplifting. Similarly, the personal punishment index
for drug purchase and shoplifting also included the sum of all offenses except the one in
question. Punishment avoidance indices were calculated in the same manner, by adding the
punishment avoidance experiences for each offense (drunk driving, drug purchase, shoplifting,
car theft, vandalism, burglary, public disturbance, assault, driving without a license, and whether
respondents have started a fistfight) except the one in question. These indices are labeled,
“Personal Punishment Avoidance (other crimes).”

Vicarious Experience
Piquero and Pogarsky (2002) note that individuals could be exposed to punishment
experiences and punishment avoidance experiences by a very small or very large number of
acquaintances. Thus, utilizing frequencies to assess an individual’s vicarious experiences would
present problems. Instead, this dissertation followed the lead of Piquero and Pogarksy (2002) by
assessing vicarious experiences based on proportions. To measure an individual’s vicarious
experience with punishment for the drunk driving vignette, participants were asked to report the
percentage of the people they know who have ever been charged with driving while under the
influence of alcohol. To measure an individual’s vicarious experiences with avoiding
punishment, this answer was subtracted from each participant’s estimate of the percentage of the
people they know who have driven drunk “on at least several occasions.” This calculation
produced an approximation of the percentage of acquaintances that have driven while intoxicated
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but have not been punished. Vicarious experiences with punishment for the drug purchase
scenario were measured by asking participants the percentage of the people they know
personally who have ever been charged with buying illegal drugs. To measure an individual’s
vicarious experiences with avoiding punishment, this response was subtracted from each
participant’s estimate of the percentage of people they know who have bought drugs illegally “on
at least several occasions.” This calculation thereby yielded an estimate of the percentage of
acquaintances that have bought drugs illegally but have not been punished. To measure vicarious
experiences with punishment for the shoplifting scenario, participants were asked to report the
percentage of the people they know who have ever been charged with taking something from a
store without paying for it. To measure an individual’s vicarious experiences with avoiding
punishment, this response was subtracted from each participant’s estimate of the percentage of
the people they know who have taken something from a store without paying for it “on at least
several occasions.” Thus, this calculation produced an estimate of the percentage of
acquaintances that have shoplifted but have not been punished.
Three additional measures of vicarious experience were also included in the current
study. Traditional statements of general deterrence theory do not specify that an individual must
know the person who receives (or avoids) punishment in order for the event to influence the
perceived risk of punishment. Individuals may attain knowledge about crime and the criminal
justice system from individuals their friends know but they do not, or from television,
newspapers, or other media (Surette, 1997). Stafford and Warr (1993) assert that the closest
associations will have the largest effect. Even still, assessments of vicarious experience used in
previous studies, those examining only people known to the participant (Paternoster & Piquero,
1995; Piquero & Paternoster, 1998; Piquero & Pogarsky, 2002), significantly limits the general
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deterrence concept. To measure an individual’s vicarious punishment experiences from beyond
his or her immediate social circle, participants were asked to estimate “besides the people you
know personally” how often do people get caught for driving drunk, for buying illegal drugs, and
for shoplifting. Vicarious experiences with avoiding punishment were attained by subtracting
this estimate from the participant’s account of how often he or she thinks individuals drive after
drinking too much, purchase illegal drugs, and take things from stores without paying for them.
As an additional component of vicarious experience, several sets of questions assess an
individuals’ consumption of the media as well as his or her perceptions of its credibility and
accountability. To measure media consumption, participants were asked how many hours during
a typical weekday (Monday through Friday) they spend watching television, listening to the
radio, reading newspapers, reading magazines, and surfing the Internet. Participants were also
asked to estimate these same numbers of hours during a typical weekend day (Saturday and
Sunday). Weekly consumption measures were created for each television, radio, newspaper,
magazine, and Internet.
To measure perceptions of media credibility, participants were asked how closely
television, the radio, newspapers, magazines, and the Internet represent life the way it really is.
Inmates indicated their level of credibility with each element of media on a 4-point Likert scale.
All responses were summed and divided by the number of items answered to produce an index
where higher scores indicate greater credibility (alpha = 0.74). In addition, respondents also rated
on a Likert scale how helpful the following sources would be if the respondent was looking for
ideas on how to commit a crime: movies, music videos, magazines and books, newspaper stories,
and television shows. All responses were summed and divided by the number of items answered
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to produce an index where higher scores indicate greater helpfulness for ideas on how to commit
a crime (alpha = 0.87).

Punishment Certainty
After reading each hypothetical vignette, participants were asked to approximate on a
scale from 0 to 100 the certainty of punishment under the situation described (i.e., the chance of
getting pulled over by the police for drinking and driving; the change of getting caught by Work
Release for buying illegal drugs; or the chance of getting caught by the clerk for shoplifting). As
noted by Klepper and Nagin (1989), providing a specified certainty of punishment would be
artificial. Allowing respondents to approximate the certainty of punishment avoids a forced
response that would not necessarily relate to the participants’ actual perspectives.
Additionally, an experimental manipulation of the perceived risk of punishment certainty
was also included. The drunk driving scenario was randomized to exclude or include the
following sentence expected to influence respondents’ perceptions of punishment certainty,
“Since it is a holiday, the police have increased the number of drinking and driving patrols, and
may even conduct random sobriety checks.” This statement was used previously in a study by
Nagin and Pogarsky (2001, p. 874). The remaining two scenarios were randomized to include
one of two statements expected to influence respondents’ perceptions of punishment certainty. In
the drug purchase scenario, one of these two statements was included: “You have the money to
buy whatever you want” or “You have the money to buy whatever you want but you have heard
that Corrections is cracking down on illegal drug purchase and is increasing random searches of
work release inmates.” In the shoplifting scenario, one of the following two statements was
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included: “You notice that you are out of sight from the only clerk, who is reading the newspaper
behind the counter, and there seem to be no video cameras or other types of security devices in
the store” or “You notice that the clerk might be able to see you in a mirror and there is a video
security camera at the front of the store.” Work release inmates were randomly assigned to one
of two manipulations of punishment certainty: less certain or more certain.

Punishment Severity
To measure the effects of severity for the drunk driving scenario, this survey replicated
Piquero and Pogarsky’s (2002) assessment of potential punishment. Respondents were informed
that if convicted for driving under the influence, they would not receive a fine or go to jail;
however, their driver’s license would be suspended. Inmates were randomly assigned to one of
two punishments: either a three month driver’s license suspension or a twelve month driver’s
license suspension. Similarly, the drug purchase scenario informed inmates that if convicted for
buying drugs illegally, respondents would be sentenced to community service hours. Inmates
were randomly assigned to one of two punishments, either 20 hours of community service or 200
hours. The shoplifting scenario informed participants that if convicted, they would not go to jail;
however, they would receive a fine. Inmates were randomly assigned to one of two fines: $100
or $500. Therefore, this dissertation included an experimental manipulation of punishment
severity.
According to Florida law, the sentences for all three offenses are reasonable. For
example, an individual arrested for driving under the influence is subject to receiving a driver’s
license suspension up to one year for first time offenders (Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law,
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2005). An individual convicted of buying drugs illegally may be charged with anything from a
first-degree misdemeanor to a second-degree felony, all which would include some amount of
community service hours (Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act,
2005). Finally, for the shoplifting scenario, an individual may be charged with a misdemeanor of
the second-degree for shoplifting an item under $10, punishable by a fine not to exceed $500
(Florida Anti-Fencing Act, 2005).2

Extralegal Costs and Benefits
Driving after drinking, buying illegal drugs, and shoplifting may involve both positive
and negative effects that are unrelated to legal consequences. To assess a potential benefit of
driving drunk, buying illegal drugs, and shoplifting, respondents were asked how much they
would enjoy driving home from the bar, buying illegal drugs, and taking the cold medicine
without paying for it. To assess the effect of potential extralegal negative consequences of each
offense described in the scenarios, the participants were asked several questions. First,
participants were asked to estimate independently how ashamed they would feel of themselves if
they drove home drunk from the bar, purchased illegal drugs, or took the cold medicine without
paying for it even if no one else found out. Relatedly, each participant reported how morally
wrong it would be to drive home drunk, buy illegal drugs, and take the cold medicine without
paying for it.

2

As an additional check on the realism of the scenarios, I requested that the penalties be reviewed by a
practicing Florida criminal defense attorney. The attorney agreed that the punishments were realistic for
each crime.
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Impulsivity
Impulsivity is a factor in how individuals weigh their future outcomes (Nagin &
Pogarsky, 2004). The current study replicated Piquero and Pogarsky’s (2002) measure of
impulsivity by taking six questions from the Barratt Impulsivity Index (Bachorowski &
Newman, 1985). Inmates were asked to identify their level of agreement or disagreement with
each statement on a five-point Likert scale. All responses were added together and divided by the
total number of items answered to create an index where higher scores signified greater
impulsivity (alpha = 0.57). Sitren and Applegate (2006 & 2007) reported alpha levels for the
Barratt Impulsivity Index used in the previous tests of Stafford and Warr’s (1993) restatement.
Alpha levels of 0.76 were reported in both studies, thereby suggesting the impulsivity scale used
is internally consistent. Even though the alpha level in this study was slightly lower (alpha =
0.57), the reliability analysis is still acceptable (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006).

Religiosity
Criminologists have long examined the relationship between religiosity and crime. As
noted by Cochran, Wood, and Arneklev (1994), the traditional belief predicts a significant
influence of religion on both society and human behavior. Hirschi and Starke (1969) observed
this relationship in their landmark study, “Hellfire and Delinquency.” Contrary to predictions,
Hirschi and Stark (1969) found that frequent church goers and students who believed in the
supernatural world were just as likely to engage in deviant behavior as those who did not believe
in life after death. These findings sparked additional research to examine the relationship
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between hellfire and delinquency, several studies demonstrating support for the religious impact
on crime (Rohrbaugh & Jessor, 1975; Higgins & Albrecht, 1977).
Therefore, as a possible confounding variable, the issue of religiosity as it relates to crime
was addressed. Evans, Cullen, Dunaway, and Burton (1995) examined the aspect of religious
salience, a concept that represents the practical influence of religion in every day life. This aspect
of religiosity measures important attachment and belief elements. Evans et al. (1995) created a
religious salience scale consisting of three statements that measured the effect of religious beliefs
on daily behavior as well as the extent to which one relies on a set of religious beliefs or
religious community. This index was replicated by asking the participants to indicate their level
or agreement or disagreement on a 5-point Likert scale with the following three statements:
“Religion is a very important part of my life,” “Following God’s commandments is important to
me,” and “In times of personal trouble, I turn to religion for guidance.” All responses were
summed and divided by the number of items answered to produce an index where higher scores
indicate greater religiosity (alpha = 0.84). Evans et al. (1995) report a 0.85 alpha level for the
religious salience scale, thereby indicating an internally consistent scale.

Other Control Variables
Respondents were asked several other questions regarding their gender, race, age, marital
status, weekly income, education level, and how long they have been on work release. For the
analyses below, education level was coded so that higher scores indicated more schooling (1 =
middle school, 2 = high school, 3 = some college, 4 = college graduate) and marital status was
dummy coded (0 = not single, 1 = single). Race was collapsed into three categories – African

59

American, Caucasian, and other – and dummy variables were created. The next chapter presents
the results for this study. The deterrent effects for each behavior will be examined and presented,
and a discussion of deterrent patterns observed across the three behaviors will conclude the
chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
The purpose of this study is to test the core predictions of Stafford and Warr: (H1)
personal and vicarious experiences with punishment will decrease the likelihood of future
offending by increasing the perceived certainty of punishment; and (H2) conversely, personal and
vicarious experiences with punishment avoidance will decrease an individual’s perception of the
certainty of punishment, thereby increasing an individual’s future tendency to offend. It also
provides beginning evidence on the question of whether Stafford and Warr’s (1993) model
should be expanded to include extra-legal considerations drawn from rational choice theory. A
series of statistical analyses will follow, including descriptives, bivariate correlations, and
multivariate linear regressions. Three separate analyses will be performed to examine the
behaviors in each hypothetical scenario – drunk driving, drug purchase, and shoplifting. The first
table will present descriptive results for demographic variables and for the shared variables
between the scenarios. Next, the results from each scenario – descriptives for the main
independent variables and the dependent variable, bivariate correlations, and multivariate linear
regressions – will be presented.3 Each behavior will be discussed separately because this
dissertation is examining the deterrent effect on three different behaviors. Finally, this section
will conclude with a discussion of deterrent patterns observed across the three behaviors.

3

Because the dependent variables were positively skewed, this dissertation also examined the data using
tobit regressions (Breen, 1996). None of the variables were affected.
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Table 3 reports descriptive values for demographic variables and any other variables that
are shared between the three scenarios. For the 326 respondents, the average age was 33 (SD =
11.07), and 84% of the sample was male. The largest portion of respondents was African
American (46%), followed by 31% Caucasian, and the remainder of the sample reported being
Hispanic, mixed race, or other. Only 2.4% opted to complete the Spanish version of the survey.
The highest level of education that most of the participants completed was high school (64%)
and the majority of respondents were single (64%). The average weekly income reported was
$400 with over half of the sample reporting that they earned over $360 a week. The average
amount of time incarcerated at Work Release was slightly under 5 weeks. Additionally, inmates
listened to the radio and watched television on a weekly basis more often than reading
newspapers, magazines, or surfing the Internet. Several indices were also created to measure
perceived media helpfulness, perceived media credibility, impulsivity, and religiosity.
Participants perceived media credibility (X̄ = 2.46) to be slightly higher than that of media
helpfulness (X̄ = 2.21). The average level of religiosity reported was 3.57, and the average level
of impulsivity was 2.96, indicating that as a group, the inmates were moderately impulsive and
tended to see religion as an important aspect of their lives.
There were a few variables – including income and the number of times in the past five
years that respondents had driven drunk; purchased illegal drugs; taken something from a store
without paying for it; hurt or threatened to hurt someone with a weapon; acted loud, rowdy, or
unruly in a public place; driven a car without the owner’s permission; broken into a house or
building; vandalized someone’s property; driven without a license; and started a fistfight – that
contained extreme outliers (e.g., 1,000,000 times having previously driven drunk in the past five
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years). These extreme values had marked effects on empirical analyses and thus were recoded to
the 95th percentile. The next section includes analyses for the drunk driving behavior.
Table 3 Descriptive Results for Demographic and Shared Variables between the Scenarios
Variable
Gender (0=male, 1=female)
Age
Weekly Income
Incarceration Length
Weekly TV Consumption
Weekly Radio Consumption
Weekly Newspaper Consumption
Weekly Magazine Consumption
Weekly Internet Consumption
Media Helpfulness Index
Media Credibility Index
Impulsivity Index
Religious Salience Index
Certainty of Punishment Manipulation (0=low, 1=high)
Severity of Punishment Manipulation (0=low, 1=high)
Spanish Version (0=no, 1=yes)

Mean

SD

0.16
33.37
400.82
4.73
23.68
33.32
8.75
8.22
7.96
2.21
2.46
2.96
3.57
0.49
0.50
0.02

0.37
11.07
308.55
6.21
22.95
35.50
13.68
13.50
19.53
0.89
0.64
0.71
1.06
0.50
0.50
0.15

Frequency

Percent

Race
African American
Caucasian
Hispanic
Mixed Race
Other
Marital Status
Single
Married
Divorced
Widowed
Education Level
Middle School
High School
Some College
College Graduate
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149
102
45
14
16

45.7
31.3
13.8
4.3
4.9

208
63
45
9

63.8
19.3
13.8
2.8

30
207
72
14

9.2
63.5
22.1
4.3

Analyses for the Drunk Driving Behavior
Table 4 reports means and standard deviations for key variables in the drunk driving
scenario. A substantial number of participants indicated there was a possibility they would drive
home under the influence of alcohol if they found themselves in the situation described in the
hypothetical vignette. The average likelihood of offending for all respondents was 38%. Many of
the respondents also had previous experiences driving when they believed that their blood
alcohol level was the above the legal limit. The average number of occasions that inmates
admitted to having previously driven while under the influence of alcohol in the past 5 years was
17, with nearly 20% admitting they had done so on more than 80 occasions (not reported in the
table). Personal experiences with punishment, being arrested for driving while under the
influence, were rather small with 85% reporting zero times of being arrested for driving under
the influence. By and large, when participants drove while intoxicated, few of them actually
experienced punishment. Participants avoided punishment approximately 17 times, with 10% of
the sample avoiding a DUI arrest more than 90 times in the past five years.
Indices for personal punishment and punishment avoidance experiences with other crimes
were also created for each scenario. Findings indicate much higher values for the personal
punishment avoidance experiences with other crimes (X̄ = 260.59) compared with that of
receiving punishment (X̄ = 1.91). Respondents were also asked to report the percentage of people
known personally who have ever been charged with drunk driving. The average for vicarious
experiences with punishment was approximately 16%. Vicarious experience with avoiding
punishment was significantly higher with an average of 30%. As separate measures of an
individual’s vicarious experiences, respondents were also asked to estimate on a 5-point scale
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their experiences with punishment (X̄ = 2.68) and punishment avoidance (X̄ = 1.02) beyond their
social circle. On average, the respondents estimated the certainty of punishment under the
circumstances described in the vignette at 47%. Most of the respondents indicated that the
hypothetical scenario was realistic (X̄ = 41.39). And finally, respondents did not feel as though
they would greatly benefit from driving home in the given situation (X̄ = 24.68), nor did they
report strong feelings of shame (X̄ = 35.32). On the other hand, there was a fairly strong sense
that driving drunk would be morally wrong (X̄ = 70.00).
Table 4 Scenario Specific Descriptive Results: Drunk Driving
Variable
Likelihood of Offending
Personal Punishment (drunk driving)
Personal Punishment (other crimes)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (drunk driving)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (other crimes)
Vicarious Punishment
Vicarious Punishment Beyond Social Circle
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance Beyond Social Circle
Certainty of Punishment
Extralegal Benefits
Shame (extralegal costs)
Morally Wrong (extralegal costs)
Realism of the Hypothetical Scenario

Mean

SD

37.85
0.20
1.91
16.75
260.59
15.90
2.68
29.49
1.02
47.49
24.68
35.32
70.00
41.39

34.87
0.53
3.26
31.82
503.43
20.59
1.03
25.21
0.85
27.09
29.44
35.87
34.83
35.93

Table 5 reports zero-order correlations between the variables in this study. Consistent
with Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization of deterrence, intentions to drive drunk
under the hypothetical vignette significantly increased with several measures of avoiding
punishment: personal experiences with avoiding punishment (drunk driving), personal
punishment avoidance experiences with other crimes, and vicarious experiences with avoiding
punishment beyond the respondent’s social circle. However, contrary to Stafford and Warr’s
(1993) restatement, neither form of prior punishment (personal or vicarious) appeared to
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Table 5 Zero-Order Correlations between Dimensions of Deterrence, Rational Choice, Individual Differences, and Controls for Drunk Driving (N=326)
y1
Likelihood of Offending (y1)
1.00
Personal Punishment Drunk Driving (x1) -.02
Personal Punishment Other Crimes (x2)
.12*
Personal Punishment Avoidance DD (x3)
.23*
Personal Punishment Avoidance Other (x4) .18*
Vicarious Punishment (x5)
.19*
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance (x6)
.09
Vicarious Punishment 2 (x7)
-.08
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance 2 (x8)
.14*
Certainty of Punishment (x9)
.04
Extralegal Benefits (x10)
.36*
Shame (x11)
-.22*
Morally wrong (x12)
-.09
Realism of the Hypothetical Scenario (x13) .45*
Impulsivity Index (x14)
.23*
Religious Salience Index (x15)
-.17*
Certainty of Punishment Manipulation (x16) .15*
Severity of Punishment Manipulation (x17) -.01
Spanish Version (x18)
.05
Weekly TV Consumption (x19)
-.04
Weekly Radio Consumption (x20)
-.01
Weekly Newspaper Consumption (x21)
-.09
Weekly Magazine Consumption (x22)
-.05
Weekly Internet Consumption (x23)
-.08
Media Helpfulness Index (x24)
.07
Media Credibility Index (x25)
.13*
Gender (x26)
-.04
Age (x27)
-.11
Weekly Income (x28)
.03
Incarceration Length (x29)
-.04
.05
African American (x30)
Caucasian (x31)
.05
.11*
Marital Status (x32)
-.01
Education Level (x33)

x1

x2

x3

x4

x5

x6

x7

x8

x9

x10

x11

x12

x13

x14

x15

x16

1.00
.01
.20*
-.05
.15*
.02
-.03
.04
.03
-.05
-.01
-.08
.14*
-.05
-.10
-.09
.01
.05
-.04
-.03
-.09
-.08
-.09
.00
-.06
-.05
.08
.07
.19*
-.02
.06
-.04
.06

1.00
.22*
.25*
.18*
.02
-.02
.06
-.06
-.01
-.08
-.03
.10
.06
-.06
.02
-.06
-.01
.01
.00
.02
-.01
-.11
.14*
.07
-.05
-.09
.05
-.02
-.07
.09
.07
-.05

1.00
.30*
.20*
.19*
.02
.07
-.09
.05
-.22*
-.07
.25*
.17*
-.16*
.06
-.04
.06
-.08
.01
-.11
-.12*
-.11
-.00
.01
-.07
-.02
.04
.01
-.10
.16*
-.02
.07

1.00
.10
.22*
.05
.04
-.03
.08
-.27*
-.00
.08
.18*
-.12*
.04
.01
-.06
-.10
.02
-.09
-.07
-.07
.04
.09
.07
-.12*
-.01
.01
-.11
.16*
.03
.08

1.00
-.08
.19*
-.01
.02
.05
-.09
.15*
.25*
.08
.05
-.05
-.08
.03
-.03
-.02
-.09
-.07
-.10
-.01
.09
.10
-.04
-.02
.08
-.07
.10
.03
-.01

1.00
.00
.15*
.01
.06
-.15*
.02
.09
.17*
-.10
-.01
-.06
-.03
-.06
.08
-.01
.01
-.07
-.06
-.14*
-.01
-.08
.14*
.01
-.14*
.11*
-.04
.08

1.00
-.49*
.12*
-.14*
-.04
.24*
-.02
-.03
.10
.08
.13*
-.18*
-.12*
.04
-.04
-.03
.06
-.17*
.00
.10
-.06
.10
.01
-.17*
.15*
.04
.02

1.00
-.06
.13*
-.08
-.05
.11*
.06
-.03
-.08
-.05
.07
-.04
-.11*
-.04
-.12*
-.08
.08
-.06
.06
.06
-.07
.12*
-.02
.05
-.01
.09

1.00
-.08
.13*
.21*
.10
.03
.05
.05
-.00
.04
.00
-.02
-.00
-.01
.08
-.04
.07
.03
.02
.12*
-.02
-.08
.03
-.11*
.03

1.00
-.23*
-.19*
.22*
.09
-.09
-.00
-.07
-.01
-.01
.03
-.08
-.06
-.05
.03
-.02
-.02
-.06
-.10
.10
.18*
-.17*
.06
-.02

1.00
.25*
-.10
-.11*
.16*
-.60
-.02
.10
.08
-.01
.12*
.05
.18*
-.06
.05
.06
.07
-.02
-.01
-.11*
.01
-.16*
.01

1.00
.06
-.02
.20*
.01
.00
.02
-.02
-.06
-.04
-.06
.04
-.11
-.07
.06
.02
.04
-.06
-.25*
.17*
-.00
.02

1.00
.09
-.18*
.13*
-.06
.11*
-.11*
-.06
-.09
-.06
.01
-.05
.09
-.08
-.01
.05
.10
-.04
.09
.06
.05

1.00
-.20*
.11*
-.02
.15*
.02
.06
-.04
.00
.01
.06
-.03
.11
.04
-.02
.01
-.14*
.11*
-.13*
.01

1.00
.06
.02
-.20*
.11*
-.08
.08
-.05
.05
-.03
.02
.07
-.02
-.17*
.01
.18*
-.13*
.01
-.07

1.00
-.01
-.04
.04
-.06
-.03
-.09
-.02
-.00
.01
-.03
.01
.09
.00
.04
-.00
.03
-.06
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Severity of Punishment Manipulation (x17)
Spanish Version (x18)
Weekly TV Consumption (x19)
Weekly Radio Consumption (x20)
Weekly Newspaper Consumption (x21)
Weekly Magazine Consumption (x22)
Weekly Internet Consumption (x23)
Media Helpfulness Index (x24)
Media Credibility Index (x25)
Gender (x26)
Age (x27)
Weekly Income (x28)
Incarceration Length (x29)
African American (x30)
Caucasian (x31)
Marital Status (x32)
Education Level (x33)

x17
x18
x19
x20
x21
x22
x23
x24
x25
x26
x27
x28
x29
x30
x31
x32
x33
1.00
.00 1.00
-.10 -.03 1.00
-.06 -.06 .33* 1.00
-.03 -.04 .41* .27* 1.00
-.03 -.02 .36* .35* .76* 1.00
.01 -.05 .22* .26* .40* .31* 1.00
.01 .09 .08 -.03 .14* .10 .02 1.00
-.04 .11 .04 -.02 .14* .15* .01 .23* 1.00
-.10 -.07 .09 .04 .08 .03 .08 .05 -.05 1.00
-.07 -.02 .11 -.09 -.03 -.13* -.04 .00 -.03 .07 1.00
-.00 -.09 .06 .01 .04 .04 .13* .08 -.07 -.22* .05 1.00
-.05 .01 .01 .01 -.08 -.05 -.10 -.08 -.01 -.05 .02 .04 1.00
.01 -.15* .19* -.04 .09 .12* -.02 .03 .13* .04 -.06 -.22* .05 1.00
.00 -.11 -.12* -.02 -.11 -.16* -.03 .08 -.05 .01 .07 .18* -.00 -.62* 1.00
-.01 -.13* -.06 -.01 -.04 .04 -.12* -.02 .00 -.09 -.31* -.04 .04 .12* -.02 1.00
-.02 -.14* -.10 -.12* -.04 -.06 .15* -.03 -.07 -.07 .04 .21* .03 -.15* .12* -.17* 1.00
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influence future offending. In fact, a positive relationship was found between an individual’s
vicarious experiences with punishment and his or her likelihood of offending. Additionally, an
individual’s personal punishment experiences with other crimes significantly encouraged
offending. Also contrary to the deterrence framework, the experimental manipulations of
perceived punishment certainty and punishment severity did not seem to deter offending.
Several extralegal considerations were found to be relevant to the decision to drive drunk.
The possible benefit of drinking and driving in the vignette significantly encouraged future
offending while perceived shame significantly decreased the likelihood of offending. As shown
in Table 5, intentions to offend were significantly higher for respondents who were more
impulsive, had higher perceptions of media credibility, and those who were less religious. The
more realistic respondents perceived the hypothetical vignette to be, the more likely they were to
engage in offending. Finally, marital status was found to be significantly related to future
offending. Single people had a higher likelihood of driving home drunk in the scenario.
Stafford and Warr (1993) predict that an individual’s personal and vicarious experiences
with punishment and punishment avoidance will influence his or her perceived risk of
apprehension, thereby, influencing the likelihood of future offending. To more rigorously test
these hypotheses this study computed regression equations with key dimensions of deterrence,
rational choice, individual differences, and other control variables. Table 6 presents the
multivariate results of regressing likelihood of offending on the key dimensions of deterrence.
The findings from Table 6 indicate partial support for Stafford and Warr’s (1993) model.
As predicted by the reconceptualization, the likelihood of driving drunk increases with greater
personal punishment avoidance experiences. Contrary to Stafford and Warr’s (1993)
reconceptualization, both personal and vicarious experiences with punishment do not
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significantly influence an individual’s likelihood of offending. In fact, a positive relationship was
found between an individual’s vicarious experiences with punishment and his or her likelihood
of driving drunk. This study included an experimental manipulation for the certainty of
punishment. Contrary to perceptual deterrence literature, findings indicate a positive relationship
between the certainty of punishment and the likelihood of offending, that is, when the certainty
of punishment was higher respondents tended to report a 10% greater likelihood that they would
drive home drunk. Other measures of certainty and the experimental manipulation of punishment
severity were not found to be significant. Overall, approximately 12% of the variation in the
dependent variable (likelihood of driving drunk) was explained by the independent variables in
the model.
Table 6 Regression of the Likelihood of Driving Drunk on Dimensions of Deterrence
B
-4.99
.26
.18
.01
.33
-3.15
.08
3.81
.11
10.31
2.23

Personal Punishment (drunk driving)
Personal Punishment (other crimes)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (drunk driving)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (other crimes)
Vicarious Punishment
Vicarious Punishment Beyond Social Circle
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance Beyond Social Circle
Certainty of Punishment
Certainty of Punishment Manipulation (0=low, 1=high)
Severity of Punishment Manipulation (0=low, 1=high)

Beta
-.08
.02
.17
.08
.20
-.09
.06
.09
.08
.15
.03

Sig.
.17
.66
.00
.15
.00
.14
.27
.13
.11
.01
.55

Constant = 18.754
F = 4.995
R2 = 0.121

Table 7 presents the multivariate results of regressing likelihood of driving drunk on
dimensions of deterrence, rational choice, individual differences, and other controls. Findings
indicate no support for the deterrence doctrine. Across the dimensions of deterrence, results
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Table 7 Regression of the Likelihood of Driving Drunk on Dimensions of Deterrence, Rational Choice, Individual
Differences and Controls
B
Dimensions of Deterrence
Personal Punishment (drunk driving)
Personal Punishment (other crimes)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (drunk driving)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (other crimes)
Vicarious Punishment
Vicarious Punishment Beyond Social Circle
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance Beyond Social Circle
Certainty of Punishment
Certainty of Punishment Manipulation (0=low, 1=high)
Severity of Punishment Manipulation (0=low, 1=high)

Beta

Sig.

-3.01
-.08
.06
.00
.18
-.71
.01
.27
.02
3.14
-.86

-.05
-.01
.05
.01
.11
-.02
.01
.01
.02
.05
-.01

.42
.89
.40
.89
.09
.77
.92
.92
.76
.44
.82

Rational Choice
Extralegal Benefits
Shame
Morally Wrong

.25
-.05
-.10

.22
-.05
-.10

.00
.44
.13

Individual Differences
Impulsivity Index
Religious Salience Index

8.19
-.80

.18
-.02

.00
.68

Demographics
Gender (0=male, 1=female)
Age
Weekly Income
Incarceration Length
African American (0=no, 1=yes)
Caucasian (0=no, 1=yes)
Marital Status (0=not single, 1=single)
Education Level

-1.63
-.18
-.00
-.73
2.40
10.20
2.86
1.31

-.02
-.06
-.02
-.13
.03
.14
.04
.03

.78
.32
.75
.02
.65
.05
.51
.66

Other Controls
Weekly TV Consumption
Weekly Radio Consumption
Weekly Newspaper Consumption
Weekly Magazine Consumption
Weekly Internet Consumption
Media Helpfulness Index
Media Credibility Index
Realism of the Hypothetical Scenario
Spanish Version (0=no, 1=yes)

.10
-.01
-.31
.18
-.04
.21
2.62
.41
3.31

.06
-.01
-.13
.08
-.02
.01
.05
.42
.01

.35
.92
.19
.45
.72
.93
.44
.00
.88

Constant = -8.557
F = 5.159
R2 = 0.386
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showed no significant relationship between an individual’s likelihood of offending and any
measure of personal and vicarious experience with punishment and punishment avoidance. This
study also expected to find significant relationships between the dependent variable and
measures of perceived certainty and severity of punishment but these considerations were not
significantly related to intentions to drive drunk.
Consistent with this study’s hypotheses, however, one element of rational choice was
found to influence the dependent variable in the predicted direction. That is, greater predicted
enjoyment increased the likelihood of driving home drunk. Several additional results are less
directly relevant to deterrence or rational choice models but are worth noting. As shown in Table
7, intentions to drive drunk were significantly higher for respondents who were Caucasian, more
impulsive, and for those who were incarcerated for shorter periods of time. The more realistic the
hypothetical scenario, the more likely the respondent would be to engage in future offending.
Finally, other elements of rational choice, individual differences, demographics, and other
controls were unrelated to the dependent variable. The next section presents the findings for the
drug purchase scenario.
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Analyses for the Drug Purchase Behavior
Table 8 reports on the main independent and dependent variables for the drug purchase
scenario. The average likelihood of offending for all respondents in the drug purchase
hypothetical scenario was 25%. Again, participants admitted to substantial activity in the
purchase of illegal drugs. The average number of times that inmates reported having previously
purchased illegal drugs in the past five years was over two hundred, with close to 10% of the
sample purchasing illegal drugs over 1000 times (not reported in the table). Personal experiences
with punishment, the number of times arrested for illegal drug purchase in the past five years,
were considerable with 30% of the sample reporting having been arrested one time or more. The
average number of times participants bought illegal drugs without getting caught was nearly 200.
Findings indicated a much higher value for personally avoiding punishment for other
crimes (X̄ = 80.19) compared with that of receiving punishment for other crimes (X̄ = 1.55).
Respondents were also asked to report the percentage of people known personally who have ever
been charged with buying illegal drugs. The average for vicarious experiences with punishment
was approximately 27%. Vicarious experience with avoiding punishment was slightly lower with
an average of 25%. As separate measures of an individual’s vicarious experiences, respondents
were also asked to estimate on a 5-point scale their experiences with punishment (X̄ = 2.84) and
punishment avoidance (X̄ = 0.96) beyond their social circle. On average, the respondents
estimated the certainty of punishment under the circumstances described in the vignette at 69%.
The average response for the realism of the scenario was 29.17 they would find themselves in the
situation described. Finally, respondents did not feel as though they would greatly benefit from
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purchasing illegal drugs in the given situation (X̄ = 16.32), and they tended to believe it would be
morally wrong (X̄ = 71.93) and they would feel ashamed (X̄ = 57.76).
Table 8 Scenario Specific Descriptive Results: Purchasing Illegal Drugs
Variable
Likelihood of Offending
Personal Punishment (drug purchase)
Personal Punishment (other crimes)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (drug purchase)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (other crimes)
Vicarious Punishment
Vicarious Punishment Beyond Social Circle
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance Beyond Social Circle
Certainty of Punishment
Extralegal Benefits
Shame (extralegal costs)
Morally Wrong (extralegal costs)
Realism of the Hypothetical Scenario

Mean

SD

25.12
0.56
1.55
198.17
80.19
27.47
2.84
24.60
0.96
69.42
16.32
57.76
71.93
29.17

33.36
1.27
2.71
450.89
122.28
30.08
1.07
25.08
0.91
32.11
28.04
41.27
37.49
34.74

Table 9 reports zero-order correlations between the key variables in this study. Consistent
with Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization of deterrence, intentions to purchase illegal
drugs under the hypothetical vignette significantly decreased with the certainty of punishment for
getting caught by corrections. However, contrary to Stafford and Warr’s (1993) restatement,
forms of prior punishment (personal punishment for drug purchase, personal punishment for
other crimes, vicarious punishment, and vicarious punishment experiences beyond the
respondent’s social circle) and punishment avoidance experiences (personal punishment
avoidance for drug purchase, personal punishment avoidance for other crimes, vicarious
punishment avoidance, and vicarious punishment avoidance beyond the respondent’s social
circle) did not influence offending. Also contrary to the deterrence framework, the experimental
manipulations of perceived punishment certainty and punishment severity were unrelated to
offending.
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Several extralegal considerations were found to be salient to decisions about purchasing
illegal drugs. The level of perceived benefit of purchasing drugs in the vignette significantly
encouraged future offending while perceived shame and moral wrongfulness both significantly
decreased the likelihood of offending. Several additional results are less directly related to a
deterrence framework but are notable. As shown in Table 9, intentions to offend were
significantly higher for females, African Americans, and respondents who were less religious.
Finally, the more realistic respondents perceived the hypothetical vignette, the more likely they
were to engage in offending.
Stafford and Warr (1993) predict that an individual’s personal and vicarious experiences
with punishment and punishment avoidance will influence his or her likelihood of offending by
affecting perceptions of punishment risk. According to Table 9, several additional variables were
found to significantly influence the perceived certainty of punishment. Consistent with Stafford
and Warr’s predictions, perceived certainty of punishment was greater for those individuals who
had more vicarious experiences of punishment from beyond their social circle. The extralegal
benefits and costs associated with the behavior in the scenario were all significantly related to
perceived certainty of punishment in the predicted directions, that is the perceived certainty of
punishment was significantly higher for respondents who felt more shameful, more moral
wrongfulness, and for those who would experience less enjoyment. The more realistic the
hypothetical scenario, the less likely that individuals believed they would be caught and
punished. Several measures of media consumption (weekly television and radio consumption) as
well as media helpfulness were negatively related to perceptions of punishment certainty.
Perceived certainty of punishment was higher for Caucasians and those with higher education
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Table 9 Zero-Order Correlations between Dimensions of Deterrence, Rational Choice, Individual Differences, and Controls for Purchasing Illegal Drugs
(N=326)
y1
Likelihood of Offending (y1)
1.00
Personal Punishment Drug Purchase (x1)
.03
Personal Punishment Other Crimes (x2)
.01
Personal Punishment Avoidance DP(x3)
.04
Personal Punishment Avoidance Other (x4) .09
Vicarious Punishment (x5)
.08
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance (x6)
-.05
Vicarious Punishment 2 (x7)
-.08
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance 2 (x8)
.03
Certainty of Punishment (x9)
-.16*
Extralegal Benefits (x10)
.53*
Shame (x11)
-.22*
Morally Wrong (x12)
-.21*
Realism of the Hypothetical Scenario (x13) .26*
Impulsivity Index (x14)
.08
Religious Salience Index (x15)
-.16*
Certainty of Punishment Manipulation (x16) .05
Severity of Punishment Manipulation (x17) -.06
Spanish Version (x18)
-.04
Weekly TV Consumption (x19)
.06
Weekly Radio Consumption (x20)
.03
Weekly Newspaper Consumption (x21)
.01
Weekly Magazine Consumption (x22)
-.04
Weekly Internet Consumption (x23)
-.03
Media Helpfulness Index (x24)
.02
Media Credibility Index (x25)
-.01
Gender (x26)
.12*
Age (x27)
.00
Weekly Income (x28)
-.01
Incarceration Length (x29)
-.04
African American (x30)
.18*
Caucasian (x31)
-.11*
.01
Marital Status (x32)
Education Level (x33)
-.05

x1

x2

x3

x4

x5

x6

x7

x8

x9

x10

x11

x12

x13

x14

x15

x16

1.00
.29*
.20*
.10
.23*
-.04
.06
-.02
.05
.02
-.01
.04
.04
.05
.03
-.04
-.01
-.01
-.01
-.02
.01
-.03
-.10
.14*
.06
.03
-.07
.04
-.02
-.04
.05
.07
-.06

1.00
.17*
.27*
.13*
.03
.01
.06
.02
.05
-.09
-.03
.06
.04
-.11*
.03
-.06
-.00
.01
.00
.01
-.02
-.10
.10
.05
-.08
-.06
.05
.02
-.08
.09
.04
-.02

1.00
.43*
.31*
.07
.03
.11*
.05
.20*
-.12*
-.04
.04
.17*
-.08
.05
.02
-.06
-.10
-.00
-.08
-.07
-.08
.03
.10
.10
-.10
-.03
.02
-.10
.15*
.02
.06

1.00
.20*
.15*
.04
.08
.02
.19*
-.16*
-.12*
.06
.17*
-.24*
.01
-.05
-.01
-.06
.08
-.10
-.08
-.03
.06
-.01
-.05
-.13*
.09
-.02
-.10
.14*
.03
.13*

1.00
-.25*
.26*
.02
.11
.09
-.08
.10
.01
.13*
.01
.01
-.04
-.01
.02
.09
-.09
-.01
-.12*
-.12*
.11*
.12*
-.11
-.15*
-.03
.02
.04
.11*
-.09

1.00
-.03
.13*
-.10
.06
-.14*
-.07
.07
.18*
-.09
.03
-.10
-.02
.01
.03
-.02
-.00
-.02
.01
-.14*
.02
-.08
.11
.01
-.02
-.07
.00
.04

1.00
-.49*
.20*
-.02
.17*
.18*
-.01
-.06
.08
.02
.10
-.07
-.09
-.02
-.12*
-.07
-.03
-.20*
.05
.13*
-.04
.01
-.04
-.12*
.04
.07
.03

1.00
-.05
.00
-.14*
.01
-.08
.00
.00
.02
.01
-.04
-.00
-.06
-.06
-.14*
-.17*
.08
-.12*
.01
-.02
-.01
.11
.08
.07
.03
.01

1.00
-.28*
.36*
.40*
-.11*
.01
.12*
-.07
.03
-.01
-.18*
-.13*
-.10
-.07
-.02
-.17*
-.01
.02
-.02
.09
-.11*
-.26*
.13*
-.09
.11*

1.00
-.29*
-.27*
.34*
.16*
-.17*
.06
.01
-.07
.03
-.02
.02
.03
-.03
.13*
.04
.02
-.03
-.02
.01
.12*
-.04
.02
.03

1.00
.51*
-.06
-.09
.26*
-.11*
.08
.05
-.05
-.07
-.04
-.07
.06
-.07
.02
.09
.16*
-.02
-.07
-.16*
.07
-.12*
.03

1.00
-.02
-.10
.28*
-.04
.01
-.07
-.01
-.11
-.07
-.12*
-.02
-.08
-.01
.08
.07
-.05
-.09
-.18*
.18*
-.02
-.05

1.00
.11
-.08
.07
-.06
.08
.12*
.06
.05
.08
.10
.08
.10
.09
-.00
-.08
-.02
.08
-.19*
-.03
-.07

1.00
-.20*
.11*
-.02
.15*
.02
.06
-.04
.00
.01
.06
-.03
.11
.04
-.02
.01
-.14*
.11*
-.13*
.01

1.00
.06
.02
-.20*
.11*
-.08
.08
-.05
.05
-.03
.02
.07
-.02
-.17*
.01
.18*
-.12*
.01
-.07

1.00
-.01
-.04
.04
-.06
-.03
-.09
-.02
-.00
.01
-.03
.01
.09
.00
.04
-.00
.03
-.06
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Severity of Punishment Manipulation (x17)
Spanish Version (x18)
Weekly TV Consumption (x19)
Weekly Radio Consumption (x20)
Weekly Newspaper Consumption (x21)
Weekly Magazine Consumption (x22)
Weekly Internet Consumption (x23)
Media Helpfulness Index (x24)
Media Credibility Index (x25)
Gender (x26)
Age (x27)
Weekly Income (x28)
Incarceration Length (x29)
African American (x30)
Caucasian (x31)
Marital Status (x32)
Education Level (x33)

x17
x18
x19
x20
x21
x22
x23
x24
x25
x26
x27
x28
x29
x30
x31
x32
x33
1.00
.00 1.00
-.10 -.03 1.00
-.06 -.06 .33* 1.00
-.03 -.04 .41* .27* 1.00
-.03 -.02 .36* .35* .76* 1.00
.01 -.05 .22* .26* .40* .31* 1.00
.01 .09 .08 -.03 .14* .10 .02 1.00
-.04 .11 .04 -.02 .14* .15* .01 .23* 1.00
-.10 -.07 .09 .04 .08 .03 .08 .05 -.05 1.00
-.07 -.02 .11 -.09 -.03 -.13* -.04 .00 -.03 .07 1.00
-.00 -.09 .06 .01 .04 .04 .13* .08 -.07 -.22* .05 1.00
-.05 .01 .01 .01 -.08 -.05 -.10 -.08 -.01 -.05 .02 .04 1.00
.01 -.15* .19* -.04 .09 .12* -.02 .03 -.13* .04 -.06 -.22* .05 1.00
.00 -.11 -.12* -.02 -.11 -.16* -.03 .08 -.05 .01 .07 .18* -.00 -.62* 1.00
-.01 -.13* -.06 -.00 -.04 .04 -.12* -.02 .00 -.09 -.31* -.04 .04 .12* -.02 1.00
-.02 -.14* -.10 -.12* -.04 -.06 .15* -.03 -.07 -.07 .04 .21* .03 -.15* .12* -.17* 1.00
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levels. Additionally, punishment certainty decreased the longer respondents were incarcerated.
Finally, as religiosity increased so did perceived certainty of punishment.
As with the prior analysis of drunk driving, a more rigorous test of the study hypotheses
was conducted by computing regression equations on dimensions of deterrence, rational choice,
individual differences, and other controls for intentions to purchase illegal drugs. Table 10
begins this analysis by presenting the multivariate results of regressing likelihood of purchasing
illegal drugs on dimensions of deterrence.
Table 10 Regression of the Likelihood of Purchasing Illegal Drugs on Dimensions of Deterrence
B
.48
-.32
.00
.03
-.08
-2.22
-.08
-.15
-.16
2.80
-2.74

Personal Punishment (drug purchase)
Personal Punishment (other crimes)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (drug purchase)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (other crimes)
Vicarious Punishment
Vicarious Punishment Beyond Social Circle
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance Beyond Social Circle
Certainty of Punishment
Certainty of Punishment Manipulation (0=low, 1=high)
Severity of Punishment Manipulation (0=low, 1=high)

Beta
.02
-.03
.00
.10
.07
-.07
-.06
-.00
-.15
.04
-.04

Sig.
.76
.66
.99
.13
.28
.31
.29
.95
.01
.46
.47

Constant = 40.511
F = 1.503
R2 = 0.017

Table 10 indicates minimal support for Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization.
In support of the model, the likelihood of purchasing illegal drugs significantly decreased with
greater perceived certainty of punishment. Contrary to the reconceptualization, measures of
personal and vicarious experiences with punishment and punishment avoidance were not found
to significantly influence an individual’s likelihood of offending. Additionally, this study also
expected to find relationships with the dependent variable and the experimental manipulations
for punishment certainty and severity but did not.
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Table 11 reports the multivariate regression analysis of an individual’s likelihood of
purchasing illegal drugs on dimensions of deterrence, rational choice, individual differences, and
controls. Findings indicated no support for the deterrence doctrine. In particular, the predicted
relationships were not found among the dimensions of personal and vicarious experiences with
punishment and punishment avoidance. Measures of punishment severity and certainty also
failed to predict an individual’s likelihood of purchasing illegal drugs.
Consistent with expanding the deterrence framework, several extralegal considerations
were found to influence future offending. The chance that participants would experience shame
was inversely related to the likelihood of purchasing illegal drugs: as the chance that an
individual would experience shame increased, his or her likelihood of offending decreased. In
contrast, greater predicted enjoyment raised the likelihood of purchasing illegal drugs. As shown
in Table 11, intentions to offend were significantly higher for respondents who were female and
for those who rated the realism of the scenario higher. Further, race was nearly significant (p =
.06). African American respondents were more likely to purchase illegal drugs in the scenario.
The next section presents the analyses for the shoplifting behavior.
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Table 11 Regression of the Likelihood of Purchasing Illegal Drugs on Dimensions of Deterrence, Rational Choice,
Individual Differences, and Controls
B
Dimensions of Deterrence
Personal Punishment (drug purchase)
Personal Punishment (other crimes)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (drug purchase)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (other crimes)
Vicarious Punishment
Vicarious Punishment Beyond Social Circle
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance Beyond Social Circle
Certainty of Punishment
Certainty of Punishment Manipulation (0=low, 1=high)
Severity of Punishment Manipulation (0=low, 1=high)

Beta

Sig.

.74
-.44
.00
-.02
-.05
-.96
-.14
1.03
.08
-3.01
-2.62

.03
-.04
.03
-.08
-.05
-.03
-.11
.03
.07
-.05
-.04

.61
.53
.63
.28
.51
.69
.09
.71
.30
.46
.51

.56
-.11
-.07

.48
-.14
-.08

.00
.05
.28

Individual Differences
Impulsivity Index
Religious Salience Index

-1.05
-.78

-.02
-.03

.71
.70

Demographics
Gender (0=male, 1=female)
Age
Weekly Income
Incarceration Length
African American (0=no, 1=yes)
Caucasian (0=no, 1=yes)
Marital Status (0=not single, 1=single)
Education Level

17.87
.23
.01
-.44
10.09
.21
4.67
-1.69

.19
.08
.09
-.08
.15
.00
.07
-.03

.00
.21
.17
.17
.06
.97
.30
.58

Other Controls
Weekly TV Consumption
Weekly Radio Consumption
Weekly Newspaper Consumption
Weekly Magazine Consumption
Weekly Internet Consumption
Media Helpfulness Index
Media Credibility Index
Realism of the Hypothetical Scenario
Spanish Version (0=no, 1=yes)

-.02
.10
-.12
-.26
.05
-2.98
-.02
.12
25.67

-.01
.11
-.05
-.11
.03
-.08
.00
.12
.07

.89
.10
.63
.31
.68
.21
.99
.05
.23

Rational Choice
Extralegal Benefits
Shame
Morally Wrong

Constant = 25.268
F = 4.112
R2 = 0.321
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Analyses for the Shoplifting Behavior
Table 12 reports the means and standard deviations for each variable unique to the
shoplifting scenario. A substantial number of respondents indicated that there was a possibility
they would shoplift if they found themselves in the situation described in the hypothetical
vignette. The average likelihood of offending for all respondents was 27%. Participants also
admitted to considerable past experiences with shoplifting. The average number of times that
inmates admitted to having taken something from a store without paying for it in the past 5 years
was 7, with 10% admitting they had done so on more than 20 occasions (not reported in the
table). Respondents also had some experiences with punishment for this offense, with 16% of the
sample being arrested for shoplifting once or more. The average number of times for personally
avoiding punishment was approximately 6.
As with the previous analyses, the findings indicated a higher value for personally
avoiding punishment for other crimes (X̄ = 6.48) compared with that of receiving punishment (X̄
= 1.86). Respondents were also asked to report the percentage of people known personally who
have ever been charged with shoplifting. The average for vicarious experiences with punishment
was approximately 16%. Vicarious experience with avoiding punishment was 16% as well. As
separate measures of an individual’s vicarious experiences, respondents were also asked to
estimate on a 5-point scale their experiences with punishment (X̄ = 2.57) and punishment
avoidance (X̄ = 0.86) beyond their social circle. On average, the respondents estimated the
perceived certainty of punishment under the circumstances described in the vignette at 47%. The
hypothetical scenario was regarded as moderately realistic (X̄ = 28.69). Finally, respondents did
80

not feel as though they would greatly benefit from stealing in the given situation (X̄ = 20.45),
and they tended to see the offense as morally wrong (X̄ = 73.71) and likely to generate feelings
of shame (X̄ = 56.81).
Table 12 Scenario Specific Descriptive Results: Shoplifting
Variable
Likelihood of Offending
Personal Punishment (shoplift)
Personal Punishment (other crimes)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (shoplift)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (other crimes)
Vicarious Punishment
Vicarious Punishment Beyond Social Circle
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance Beyond Social Circle
Certainty of Punishment
Extralegal Benefits
Shame (extralegal costs)
Morally Wrong (extralegal costs)
Realism of the Hypothetical Scenario

Mean

SD

26.71
0.25
1.86
6.48
270.07
15.80
2.57
15.93
0.86
46.85
20.45
56.81
73.71
28.69

32.46
0.71
3.18
14.36
508.75
24.57
1.07
19.79
0.96
31.77
30.70
40.42
35.72
34.87

Table 13 reports zero-order correlations between the variables in this study. Consistent
with Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization of deterrence, intentions to steal under the
hypothetical scenario significantly decreased with the perceived certainty of punishment. Also,
in accordance with Stafford and Warr (1993), both personal and vicarious experiences with
avoiding punishment significantly encouraged future offending. However, contrary to Stafford
and Warr’s (1993) model, neither form of prior punishment (personal or vicarious) seemed to
influence offending. In fact, a positive relationship was demonstrated between vicarious
punishment experiences and likelihood of offending, that is, a person’s vicarious punishment
experiences actually increased his or her likelihood of offending. Also contrary to the
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Table 13 Zero-Order Correlations between Dimensions of Deterrence, Rational Choice, Individual Differences, and Controls for Shoplifting (N=326)
y1
Likelihood of Offending (y1)
1.00
Personal Punishment Shoplift (x1)
.06
Personal Punishment Other Crimes (x2)
-.03
Personal Punishment Avoidance SL (x3)
.17*
Personal Punishment Avoidance Other (x4) .10
Vicarious Punishment (x5)
.18*
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance (x6)
.12*
Vicarious Punishment 2 (x7)
-.09
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance 2 (x8)
.08
Certainty of Punishment (x9)
-.16*
Extralegal Benefits (x10)
.39*
Shame (x11)
-.31*
Morally Wrong (x12)
-.16*
Realism of the Hypothetical Scenario (x13) .39*
Impulsivity Index (x14)
.19*
Religious Salience Index (x15)
-.18*
Certainty of Punishment Manipulation (x16) .05
Severity of Punishment Manipulation (x17) -.04
Spanish Version (x18)
.00
Weekly TV Consumption (x19)
.03
Weekly Radio Consumption (x20)
.07
Weekly Newspaper Consumption (x21)
-.01
Weekly Magazine Consumption (x22)
.01
Weekly Internet Consumption (x23)
-.05
Media Helpfulness Index (x24)
.04
Media Credibility Index (x25)
.00
Gender (x26)
.09
Age (x27)
-.03
Weekly Income (x28)
-.08
Incarceration Length (x29)
.05
African American (x30)
.12*
Caucasian (x31)
-.08
Marital Status (x32)
.02
-.06
Education Level (x33)

x1

x2

x3

x4

x5

x6

x7

x8

x9

x10

x11

x12

x13

x14

x15

x16

1.00
.06
.40*
.00
.21*
.02
.06
-.01
-.03
.06
-.00
.09
.19*
.13*
-.01
.08
-.00
-.06
.10
-.07
.05
-.01
-.00
.04
.00
.08
.07
-.08
-.07
-.01
.06
.05
-.05

1.00
.25*
.25*
.16*
-.01
-.03
.06
-.08
.06
-.11*
-.08
.03
.02
-.08
-.01
-.06
.01
-.01
.01
-.00
-.02
-.12*
.13*
.06
-.08
-.09
.08
.03
-.08
.09
.05
-.03

1.00
.31*
.25*
.22*
-.06
.12*
-.18*
.21*
-.23*
.01
.17*
.12*
-.17*
.05
-.02
-.03
-.06
-.02
-.08
-.09
-.07
.01
.01
.00
-.07
-.09
-.05
-.05
.11*
-.04
.03

1.00
.13*
.08
.01
.13*
-.09
.17*
-.12*
-.07
.03
.19*
-.13*
.04
.00
-.06
-.10
.02
-.09
-.07
-.07
.04
.08
.07
-.12*
-.00
.02
-.11*
.16*
.03
.09

1.00
.00
.17*
.13*
.01
.17*
-.06
-.02
.09
.13*
.04
-.02
-.08
-.01
.04
.07
-.01
-.02
-.05
-.07
.15*
.16*
.03
-.13*
-.05
.00
.02
.02
-.02

1.00
-.07
.22*
-.13*
.12*
-.25*
-.12*
.02
.10
-.12*
-.02
-.03
.06
.01
.04
.06
.08
-.02
-.04
-.07
.06
-.12*
-.03
-.02
.02
-.08
-.04
-.09

1.00
-.39*
.18*
-.06
.23*
.16*
-.09
-.14*
.15*
-.00
.11
-.12*
.01
.03
.02
-.06
.02
-.10
-.02
.07
.00
.06
-.01
-.11*
.08
.04
.05

1.00
-.16*
.13*
-.16*
-.09
.07
.11
-.00
-.03
-.02
.02
-.09
-.10
-.08
-.06
-.13*
.03
-.01
.07
-.07
-.10
.06
.09
-.03
.06
-.02

1.00
-.16*
.46*
.26*
-.03
-.10
.15*
.07
.05
.07
.12*
.06
.07
.04
.04
-.03
.12*
.15*
.09
.04
-.14*
.00
-.06
-.13*
-.04

1.00
-.36*
-.28*
.35*
.05
-.17*
.01
-.09
-.05
.06
.13*
.04
.03
-.04
-.01
-.07
.10
.04
-.02
.07
.09
-.11*
.02
-.07

1.00
.53*
-.12*
-.08
.27*
-.02
.06
-.07
.01
-.03
.02
-.02
.14*
-.05
.04
.08
.16*
.09
-.03
-.16*
.16*
-.06
.03

1.00
-.01
-.06
.22*
-.03
.03
-.06
-.08
-.05
-.00
-.01
.06
-.09
.00
.02
.08
.04
-.07
-.22*
.22*
-.02
.02

1.00
.07
-.07
.01
-.08
.09
.09
-.03
.08
.12*
-.06
.12*
.08
.08
-.01
-.13*
.07
.09
-.08
.00
-.12*

1.00
-.20*
.11*
-.02
.15*
.02
.06
-.04
.00
.01
.06
-.03
.11
.04
-.02
.01
-.14*
.11*
-.13*
.01

1.00
.05
.02
-.20*
.11*
-.08
.08
-.05
.05
-.03
.02
.07
-.02
-.17*
.01
.18*
-.12*
.01
-.07

1.00
-.01
-.04
.04
-.06
-.03
-.09
-.02
-.00
.01
-.03
.01
.09
.00
.04
-.00
.03
-.06
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Severity of Punishment Manipulation (x17)
Spanish Version (x18)
Weekly TV Consumption (x19)
Weekly Radio Consumption (x20)
Weekly Newspaper Consumption (x21)
Weekly Magazine Consumption (x22)
Weekly Internet Consumption (x23)
Media Helpfulness Index (x24)
Media Credibility Index (x25)
Gender (x26)
Age (x27)
Weekly Income (x28)
Incarceration Length (x29)
African American (x30)
Caucasian (x31)
Marital Status (x32)
Education Level (x33)

x17
x18
x19
x20
x21
x22
x23
x24
x25
x26
x27
x28
x29
x30
x31
x32
x33
1.00
.00 1.00
-.10 -.03 1.00
-.06 -.06 .33* 1.00
-.03 -.04 .41* .27* 1.00
-.03 -.02 .36* .35* .76* 1.00
.01 -.05 .22* .26* .40* .31* 1.00
.01 .09 .08 -.03 .14* .10 .02 1.00
-.04 .11 .04 -.02 .14* .15* .01 .23* 1.00
-.10 -.07 .09 .04 .08 .03 .08 .05 -.05 1.00
-.07 -.02 .11 -.09 -.03 -.13* -.04 .00 -.03 .07 1.00
-.00 -.09 .06 .01 .04 .04 .13* .08 -.07 -.22* .05 1.00
-.05 .01 .01 .01 -.08 -.05 -.10 -.08 -.01 -.05 .02 .04 1.00
.01 -.15* .19* -.04 .09 .12* -.02 .03 .13* .04 -.06 -.22* .05 1.00
.00 -.11 -.12* -.02 -.11 -.16* -.03 .08 -.05 .01 .07 .18* -.00 -.62* 1.00
-.01 -.13* -.06 -.00 -.04 .04 -.12* -.02 .00 -.09 -.31* -.04 .04 .12* -.02 1.00
-.02 -.14* -.10 -.12* -.04 -.06 .15* -.03 -.07 -.07 .04 .21* .03 -.15* .12* -.17* 1.00
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deterrence framework, the experimental manipulations of perceived punishment certainty and
punishment severity did not seem to influence future offending.
Several extralegal considerations were found to be relevant to one’s decision to steal. The
possible benefit of shoplifting in the vignette significantly encouraged future offending while
perceived shame and moral wrongfulness both significantly decreased the likelihood of
offending. As shown in Table 13, intentions to offend were significantly higher for respondents
who were more impulsive and those who were less religious. The more realistic respondents
perceived the hypothetical vignette, the more likely they were to engage in offending.
Additionally, African Americans had a higher likelihood of offending.
Stafford and Warr (1993) predict that an individual’s personal and vicarious experiences
with punishment and punishment avoidance will influence that person’s perceived risk of
punishment, thereby decreasing his or her future propensity to offend. According to Table 13,
several additional variables were found to significantly influence the perceived certainty of
punishment.
In accordance with Stafford and Warr (1993), the perceived certainty of punishment
significantly decreased with greater personal and vicarious experiences with punishment
avoidance. Also consistent with the model, as vicarious experiences with punishment outside the
respondent’s social circle increased so did the perceived certainty of punishment. The extralegal
benefits and costs associated with the behavior in the scenario were all significantly related to
perceived certainty of punishment in the predicted directions. That is the perceived certainty of
punishment was significantly higher for respondents who felt more shameful, more moral
wrongfulness, and for those who would experience less enjoyment. Contrary to findings in the
previous scenario, weekly television consumption and media credibility had a positive effect on
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perceived certainty of punishment. Gender was also found to be related to punishment certainty.
Males were more likely to be influenced by the perceived the certainty of punishment than
females. As shown in Table 13, perceptions of punishment certainty were significantly higher for
respondents who were not single, more religious, and for those who were incarcerated for shorter
periods of time.
Table 14 presents the multivariate results of regressing likelihood of shoplifting on the
dimensions of deterrence. As shown in the table, the results are partially supportive and partially
not supportive of Stafford and Warr’s (1993) model. As predicted by the reconceptualizaion, the
likelihood of shoplifting significantly decreases with greater levels of perceived certainty.
Further, personal experience with punishment for other crimes was nearly significant (p = .06)
and in the expected direction. Contrary to Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization, a
positive relationship was found between an individual’s vicarious experiences with punishment
and his or her likelihood of shoplifting. Additionally, other measures of personal and vicarious
experiences with punishment and punishment avoidance were predicted to influence likelihood
of offending, but no significant relationships were found.
Table 14 Regression of the Likelihood of Shoplifting on Dimensions of Deterrence
B
-.55
-1.09
.20
.00
.24
-3.19
.14
-1.33
-.13
3.70
-.50

Personal Punishment (shoplift)
Personal Punishment (other crimes)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (shoplift)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (other crimes)
Vicarious Punishment
Vicarious Punishment Beyond Social Circle
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance Beyond Social Circle
Certainty of Punishment
Certainty of Punishment Manipulation (0=low, 1=high)
Severity of Punishment Manipulation (0=low, 1=high)
Constant = 34.40
F = 3.013
R2 = 0.065
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Beta
-.01
-.11
.09
.06
.19
-.10
.09
-.04
-.13
.06
-.01

Sig.
.84
.06
.19
.34
.00
.09
.13
.53
.02
.30
.89

Table 15 presents the multivariate regression analysis of an individual’s likelihood of
shoplifting on dimensions of deterrence, rational choice, individual differences, and control
variables. Again, findings indicate no support for the deterrence doctrine. In particular, the
predicted relationships were not found among the dimensions of personal and vicarious
experiences with punishment and punishment avoidance. Measures of punishment severity and
certainty also failed to predict an individual’s likelihood of stealing. Contrary to Stafford and
Warr’s (1993) model, a person’s vicarious punishment experiences significantly increased future
likelihood of offending. This finding, although counterintuitive, has also been reported in
previous empirical tests of Stafford and Warr’s reconceptualization (Paternoster & Piquero,
1995; Piquero & Paternoster, 1998; Piquero & Pogarksy, 2002; Sitren & Applegate, 2006, 2007)
and this study considers the nature of this finding in the discussion below.
In support of expanding the deterrence framework, several extralegal considerations were
found to influence offending. Respondents’ likelihood of shoplifting significantly increased with
lower levels of shame and higher levels of predicted enjoyment. Individual differences,
demographics, and the majority of other control variables did not significantly influence
likelihood of offending. The sole exception was that the more realistic the respondents perceived
the scenario to be, the higher the likelihood of offending. The last section of this chapter presents
a discussion of the deterrent patterns observed across the three behaviors examined in this study.
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Table 15 Regression of the Likelihood of Shoplifting on Dimensions of Deterrence, Rational Choice, Individual
Differences, and Controls
B
Dimensions of Deterrence
Personal Punishment (shoplift)
Personal Punishment (other crimes)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (shoplift)
Personal Punishment Avoidance (other crimes)
Vicarious Punishment
Vicarious Punishment Beyond Social Circle
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance
Vicarious Punishment Avoidance Beyond Social Circle
Certainty of Punishment
Certainty of Punishment Manipulation (0=low, 1=high)
Severity of Punishment Manipulation (0=low, 1=high)

Beta

Sig.

.69
-.85
-.12
.00
.26
-.57
-.02
-.74
-.10
3.78
-3.15

.01
-.09
-.06
.06
.20
-.02
-.01
-.02
-.10
.06
-.05

.83
.14
.46
.39
.00
.77
.83
.73
.16
.33
.41

.18
-.18
.10

.17
-.22
.10

.02
.01
.18

Individual Differences
Impulsivity Index
Religious Salience Index

2.62
-3.21

.06
-.11

.33
.11

Demographics
Gender (0=male, 1=female)
Age
Weekly Income
Incarceration Length
African American (0=no, 1=yes)
Caucasian (0=no, 1=yes)
Marital Status (0=not single, 1=single)
Education Level

.10
-.04
-.00
.09
6.88
1.46
-.91
-1.10

.00
-.01
-.05
.02
.11
.02
-.01
-.02

.99
.84
.43
.78
.18
.78
.84
.72

Other Controls
Weekly TV Consumption
Weekly Radio Consumption
Weekly Newspaper Consumption
Weekly Magazine Consumption
Weekly Internet Consumption
Media Helpfulness Index
Media Credibility Index
Realism of the Hypothetical Scenario
Spanish Version (0=no, 1=yes)

-.13
.04
-.28
.16
.13
.05
.27
.23
-4.73

-.08
.05
-.13
.07
.08
.00
.00
.26
-.01

.25
.48
.24
.51
.26
.98
.93
.00
.82

Rational Choice
Extralegal Benefits
Shame
Morally Wrong

Constant = 30.527
F = 3.916
R2 = 0.307
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Deterrent Patterns Observed Across the Three Behaviors
This section reports deterrent patterns observed across the three behaviors examined in
this study – drunk driving, illegal drug purchase, and shoplifting. Comparisons will be made
across descriptives, bivariate correlations, and multivariate models. First, the descriptive results
will be compared (Tables 4, 8, and 12). Even though the average likelihood of offending was
highest for the drunk driving hypothetical scenario, a substantial number of respondents
indicated that there was a chance they would engage in other illegal activities – purchasing
illegal drugs and shoplifting – if they found themselves in the situations described in the
vignettes. Overall, participants admitted to significant experiences with each of the selected
offenses. Calling into question the deterrent ability of legal sanctions, the respondents
consistently reported much more experience with avoiding than experiencing punishment.
Although averages for perceived punishment certainty were close to 50% for all behaviors, many
respondents still believed they would engage in the illegal activity if they found themselves in
the hypothetical scenarios. Additionally, most of the respondents indicated that each hypothetical
scenario was realistic. Finally, results indicate a pattern among the extralegal considerations for
all three behaviors. Respondents felt fairly strongly that each behavior would be morally wrong
and that they would feel moderately ashamed if they engaged in the behavior described in the
scenario. On the other hand, respondents did not feel as though they would benefit greatly if they
committed the crime in each scenario.
Next, the deterrent patterns observed across the bivariate correlations will be discussed
(Tables 5, 9, and 13). Consistent with Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization of
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deterrence, intentions to drive drunk and shoplift under the hypothetical scenario significantly
increased with respondents’ personal experiences with avoiding punishment. Also consistent
with Stafford and Warr’s (1993) restatement, results indicate a negative relationship between
perceived certainty of punishment and likelihood of offending for the drug purchase and
shoplifting scenarios, that is, a person’s likelihood of offending decreases with greater levels of
perceived certainty of punishment. However, contrary to Stafford and Warr’s (1993)
reconceptualization of general and specific deterrence, neither form of prior punishment
(personal or vicarious) seemed to influence offending. In fact, a positive relationship was
demonstrated between vicarious punishment and likelihood of offending for two behaviors
(drunk driving and shoplifting). Although, several other measures of punishment and punishment
avoidance were found to influence respondents’ likelihood of driving while intoxicated and
taking something from a store without paying for it, patterns were not observed among the
behaviors. Also contrary to the deterrence framework, the experimental manipulations of
perceived punishment certainty and punishment severity did not seem to deter offending. It is
notable that across all three scenarios the experimental manipulation of punishment certainty was
unrelated to the respondents’ perceptions of how likely it was that committing the behavior
would result in punishment. Thus, a real difference in the risk of apprehension went
unrecognized by inmates.
Several patterns did emerge for the extralegal considerations. The possible benefit of
engaging in the illegal behavior described in each vignette encouraged future offending while
feelings of shame significantly decreased future offending. Moral wrongfulness was also found
to influence future offending in the predicted direction for two of the three scenarios (drug
purchase and shoplifting). Higher levels of religious salience significantly discouraged future
89

offending. Greater rates of impulsivity encouraged respondents’ likelihood of driving drunk and
shoplifting. African Americans were more likely to purchase illegal drugs and shoplift in the
scenarios. Finally, the more realistic respondents’ viewed the hypothetical scenarios, the more
likely they were to engage in offending.
The next set of patterns reported will coincide with regressing the likelihood of offending
on the key dimensions of deterrence (Tables 6, 10, and 14). Overall, findings indicate partial
support for Stafford and Warr’s (1993) model. As predicted by the reconceptualization, the
likelihood of purchasing illegal drugs and shoplifting significantly decreased with greater
perceptions of punishment certainty. Contrary to Stafford and Warr’s (1993) model, both
personal and vicarious experiences with punishment did not significantly influence likelihood of
offending. In fact, a positive relationship was found between vicarious punishment experiences
and an individual’s likelihood of driving drunk and purchasing illegal drugs. Although deterrent
relationships were predicted with other measures of personal and vicarious experiences with
punishment and punishment avoidance, no other patterns were observed across the behaviors.
Finally, the model regressing the likelihood of driving drunk on dimensions of deterrence had the
greatest explanatory power.
The final section of this comparison presents the patterns among the regressions of
likelihood of offending on dimensions of deterrence, rational choice, individual differences, and
control variables (Tables 7, 11, and 15). These analyses revealed that, once other variables were
controlled, none of the measures of deterrence significantly predicted differences in intentions to
offend in the way deterrence theory asserts. However, extralegal consequences were related,
indicating support for a rational choice perspective. Greater predicted enjoyment increased the
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likelihood of offending in each scenario. On the other hand, the chance that participants would
experience shame was inversely related to the likelihood of purchasing illegal drugs and stealing.
Individual differences, demographics, and other controls were consistently unrelated to
the dependent variable. The sole exception was that the more realistic the respondents perceived
the scenario to be, the higher the likelihood of offending. Despite the small number of significant
predictor variables, each model was able to explain more than 30% of the variation in intentions
to offend. The final chapter of this dissertation presents an overview of the key results, a
discussion of the theoretical implications, policy implications, study limitations, and directions
for future research.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

Overview of Results
Stafford and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization of deterrence has caused numerous
deterrence researchers to reassess the distinction between general and specific deterrence. More
noteworthy, Stafford and Warr introduced the concept of avoiding punishment. The theorists
claimed that experiences with punishment avoidance might be more important to the deterrence
process than legal punishment. Surely, most individuals should have a combination of personal
and vicarious experiences with punishment and experiences with avoiding punishment. Stafford
and Warr (1993) recommend the collection of several relevant variables – a person’s direct
experience with punishment; a person’s direct experience with avoiding punishment; a person’s
indirect experience with punishment; and a person’s indirect experience with avoiding
punishment.
Even though the literature examining general and specific deterrence is substantial, tests
of deterrence fail to consider several of the aspects suggested by Stafford and Warr. Rarely do
any of the previous research studies assess the effects of avoiding punishment. Additionally, the
direct and indirect effects of experience are hardly ever analyzed together. General deterrence
research is traditionally concerned with indirect experiences with punishment while specific
deterrence research is traditionally concerned with direct experiences with punishment. Thus,
Stafford and Warr make a fundamental contribution to the deterrence literature proposing the
ideas that most individuals will have a mixture of direct and indirect experiences and that
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avoiding punishment is a critical aspect of the deterrence framework. As presented in this
dissertation, Stafford and Warr’s reconceptualization has not been extensively tested. Thus far,
five prior studies have examined Stafford and Warr’s (1993) model that general and specific
deterrence processes could be incorporated into a single theory. All five studies applied Stafford
and Warr’s (1993) reconceptualization to conventional, non-offending populations, and three of
these studies had collected original data designed specifically to operationalize Stafford and
Warr’s (1993) key theoretical constructs (Piquero & Pogarsky, 2002; Sitren & Applegate, 2006;
Sitren & Applegate, 2007). The present study offered a replication and extension of these
studies, using a sample of offenders and additional measures to extend the literature in this area.
This dissertation was the first of its kind to directly test Stafford and Warr’s (1993) model,
blending specific and general deterrence, on an offending population. Additionally, this
dissertation expanded perceptual deterrence literature to include extralegal considerations. This
is a particularly salient point because non-legal costs may be more influential in criminal
decision-making than formal sanctions (Pratt et al., 2006). Several studies have found
considerable support for examining the effects of extralegal costs and benefits to perceptual
deterrence research (Nagin, 1978; Pratt et al., 2006). This chapter provides a brief synopsis of the
key empirical observations of the dissertation. Next, discussions of the theoretical implications,
crime control policy implications, study limitations, and directions for future research are
presented.
Overall, respondents admitted to a generous amount of experiences with each of the
illegal activities considered in this study. A substantial number of participants also indicated that
there was a chance they would engage in these behaviors if they found themselves in the
situations described in the vignettes. Examination of the bivariate analyses revealed some
93

support for the deterrence doctrine and the rational choice perspective. However, more rigorous
tests of these predictions revealed no support for deterrence theory. Even though this study
concluded that deterrence alone does not influence future offending, the idea of choice was
upheld. Extralegal costs and benefits impacted the respondents’ intentions to drive drunk,
purchase illegal drugs, and steal. The next section of this chapter presents the theoretical
implications, comparing the results to the study hypotheses, aspects of deterrence, and
implications for rational choice.

Theoretical Implications
The main objective of this dissertation was to test the core predictions offered by Stafford
and Warr: (H1) personal and vicarious experiences with punishment will decrease the likelihood
of future offending by increasing the perceived certainty of punishment; and (H2) conversely,
personal and vicarious experiences with punishment avoidance will decrease an individual’s
perception of the certainty of punishment, thereby increasing an individual’s future tendency to
offend. The current study also evaluated other aspects of deterrence and the impact of extralegal
sanctions on offender decision-making. Results will be evaluated across these predictions, other
features of deterrence, and implications for expanding the deterrence framework to include
elements from a rational choice perspective.
The results for the bivariate analyses indicated considerably more support for this study’s
predictions compared to the multivariate analyses. Several measures of punishment avoidance
experiences significantly increased respondent’s intentions to drive drunk and steal.
Additionally, an individual’s likelihood of offending deceased with greater levels of perceived
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certainty of punishment for the drug purchase and shoplifting scenarios. These results indicate
support for the second hypothesis of this dissertation. Contrary to this study’s hypothesis one,
neither form of punishment seemed to deter offending. In fact, a positive relationship was
revealed between vicarious punishment and future offending for driving drunk and stealing.
Therefore, evidence in support of hypothesis one – punishment experiences decreasing future
offending – was not demonstrated.
Minimal support was found for the predictions of this study when the likelihood of
offending was regressed on the key dimensions of deterrence. The likelihood of purchasing
illegal drugs and shoplifting significantly decreased with greater perceptions of punishment
certainty. Additionally, one measure of punishment avoidance was found to influence future
tendencies to offend. While no support was found for the first hypothesis, this study could argue
minimal support for the second hypothesis.
As previously discussed, some bivariate findings did substantiate several aspects of the
second core hypothesis of this study; however, once other elements – such as rational choice,
individual differences, and controls – were included in the multivariate model, certainty and
punishment avoidance were no longer significant correlates of intentions to offend. Therefore,
results were unable to corroborate either of the core predictions of this dissertation.
The present study also examined other aspects of deterrence theory. According to
deterrence theory, punishments are considered effective if they are certain and just harsh enough
to make illegal activity less beneficial. Thus, each behavior under scrutiny included experimental
manipulations of the perceived risk of punishment certainty and severity. Contrary to the
deterrence framework, experimental manipulations of perceived punishment certainty and
punishment severity did not seem to deter offending. It is notable that across the three scenarios
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the manipulation of punishment certainty was unrelated to the participants’ perceptions of how
likely it was that committing the behavior would result in punishment. Thus, a real difference in
the risk of apprehension went unrecognized by inmates. Traditional statements of specific and
general deterrence also argue that experiences with punishment and other people’s experiences
with punishment will discourage future offending. Neither form of punishment (personal or
vicarious) seemed to deter criminal behavior. This dissertation concludes that deterrence alone
does not adequately predict future offending.
One possible explanation for the lack of deterrence substantiation has to do with the
population under observation. The majority of perceptual deterrence studies have been conducted
on largely pro-social groups and have assessed minor deviant behaviors (Paternoster, 1987).
Several criminologists observe a pattern of deterrence support found among studies that draw on
college student’s self-reported intentions to offend on vignettes that may be less pronounced
among offender samples (Pratt et al, 2006; Wright et al., 2004). The current study tested
deterrence theory among a sample of offenders. This dissertation and several other studies
suggest that offenders may be very different than those typically studied in deterrence research
(Piliavian et al., 1986; Decker et al., 1993). Thus, threatened punishments for crime seem to
deter criminally prone individuals less than others.
As discussed in the literature review, one limitation characterizing deterrence research
thus far has been the lack of attention to the extralegal costs and benefits of the decision-making
process. Therefore, the present study expanded the deterrence doctrine beyond legal penalties to
include non-legal considerations. Across the bivariate analyses, the possible benefit of engaging
in the illegal behavior described in each vignette encouraged future offending while feelings of
shame significantly decreased future offending. Moral wrongfulness was also found to influence
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future offending in the predicted direction for two of the three scenarios (drug purchase and
shoplifting). Several of these relationships still presented significance in the more rigorous
multivariate tests. Greater predicted enjoyment increased the likelihood of offending in each
scenario. Also consistent with rational choice, the chance that participants would experience
shame was inversely related to the likelihood of purchasing illegal drugs and stealing. In
conclusion, this dissertation demonstrated support for a rational choice perspective, that is,
extralegal costs and benefits were found to influence the decision-making process about future
offending. These are particularly salient findings because non-legal sanctions seem to be more
influential to the deterrence process than punishment itself. Furthermore, Wood (2006) examined
the deterrent effect of nonsocial reinforcement and learning processes on an offending
population. His findings suggest that both positive and negative nonsocial reinforcers play an
important role in offender decision-making. This dissertation and several other research studies
(Nagin, 1998; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001; Wood, 2006) suggest further analysis of the effect of
extralegal sanctions on future criminal activity, especially among non-conventional populations.
Individual differences, demographics, and other controls were consistently unrelated to
the dependent variable. The sole exception was that the more realistic the respondents perceived
the scenario to be, the higher the likelihood of offending. The question about each scenario’s
realism was intended to verify whether the situation appeared reasonable. It is possible, however,
that some inmates did not distinguish fully between the situation and how they would react to it.
Thus, offenders may have interpreted these two questions as asking the same thing. The
likelihood of offending asked respondents “What is the likelihood that you would (drive
home/buy drugs/take the cold medicine) under the circumstances presented in the scenario?” The
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realism of the hypothetical scenario asked respondents “How realistic is it that you would be in
the situation above?”
Several important relationships revealed themselves in two of the scenarios. Females and
African Americans were more likely to purchase illegal drugs while Caucasians were more likely
to drive drunk in the hypothetical scenario. Correlates of offending in this study parallel
correlates of offending from official data. Recent crime trends indicate that while males are more
likely to be arrested for drug abuse violations (increasing only 20% from 1995 to 2005); the
arrest rate for females has nearly doubled in the past decade (UCR, 2005). Crime trends in the
United States also reflect this study’s findings with regards to race. In year 2005, Caucasians
represented 88% of arrests for driving under the influence, and African Americans were
disproportionately represented for drug abuse violations (UCR, 2005). The differences in
offending reported in this study are noteworthy because they are consistent with offending
behavior from official data. In other words, correlates of intended behavior are consistent with
correlates of actual behavior, supporting the validity of the current study.

Policy Implications
Current crime control proposals that attempt to prevent or reduce crime through increases
in punishment certainty and severity are attractive to policymakers for several reasons. First,
punishment or cost-oriented correctional programs are much easier to manipulate than the benefit
side. Deterring criminals by giving them harsher punishments is much more straightforward than
dealing with and trying to change offenders. Second, deterrence-based approaches are difficult to
falsify. If recidivism rates remain unchanged after the implementation of “get tough” policies
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(e.g., 10-20-life, “three strikes and you’re out” laws), then the argument can always be made that
the punishments were not harsh enough (Cullen, Pratt, Miceli, & Moon, 2002; Pratt et al., 2006).
Research shows that punishment-oriented correctional programs generally do not deter
offenders (Finckenauer, 1982; Paternoster, 1987; Cullen, Wright, & Applegate, 1996; Cullen et
al., 2002; Pratt et al., 2006). The findings of the current study and the bulk of other findings on
deterrence suggest that policymakers should look to other theories of criminal behavior for
guidance (Paternoster, 1987; Pratt et al., 2006). Had this dissertation demonstrated support for
deterrence theory, there would have been clear policy implications. Instead, implications must be
drawn from the absence of results and from other punishment philosophies. While actual
increases in the likelihood of apprehension and punishment are unlikely to deter, they have the
ability to reduce crime by subjecting more offenders to rehabilitation or by incapacitating them.
So there may be good reasons to pursue some policies (sobriety check points, crackdowns,
surveillance cameras, etc) even if they do not discourage offenders.
Another finding of the current study should be discussed for its policy implications – the
experimental manipulation of punishment certainty did not affect perceptions of the certainty of
punishment. This finding suggests that efforts to raise the chances of apprehension may help
catch people when they offend, but are not expected to dissuade individuals from offending in
the first place. The real difference in risk did not change the perceived risk.
One final policy implication develops from the current study’s significant relationship
between extralegal sanctions and future offending. Various studies have found considerable
support for examining the effect of non-legal considerations of offending decisions (Paternoster,
1989; Nagin, 1998; Nagin & Pogarksy, 2001). In fact, findings from this dissertation suggest
greater deterrent effects for non-legal considerations than for legal consequences. Despite the
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fact that deterrence generally does not appear to shape human behavior, certain and appropriately
severe punishments potentially have value by directing offenders to rehabilitation programs, by
incapacitating them, or by triggering other consequences that do influence future offending.
As noted, results from this dissertation suggest the importance of non-legal sanctions on
offending decisions. Although the current study was not specifically designed to examine the
mediating effects between formal and informal sanctions, several studies suggest that non-legal
sanctions can enhance the deterrent effects of legal sanctions (Pate & Hamilton, 1992; Sherman,
Smith, Schmidt; & Rogan, 1992; Zimring & Hawkins, 1971). According to Zimring and
Hawkins (1971, p. 39), “for the majority of people the most degrading aspect of punishment is
the social message it conveys.” Individuals who are caught and punished for their crimes not
only experience adverse formal consequences, but also experience informal consequences – such
as embarrassment, loss of an important relationship or employment – that may provide more
reason for potential offenders to desist from reoffending. Because the extralegal consequences
affect behavior and social reinforcers (see Wood, 2006) occur only in the context of
interpersonal relationships, potentially effective policies might focus on building people’s
connections to communities and other people.

Limitations and Future Directions
Five limitations – including the range of offending behaviors, variations in risks and
rewards, attention towards experiences and avoidance experiences with extralegal
considerations, the use of hypothetical vignette methodology, and social desirability bias –
characterize this study and will be discussed next. First, this dissertation was able to expand the
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range of offending behaviors to include several offenses not previously considered in perceptual
deterrence research. However, testing Stafford and Warr’s (1993) theory among a group of work
release inmates limited this study’s ability to include more serious crimes. The majority of work
release inmates are incarcerated for nonviolent offenses, such as property crimes, drug abuse
violations, and motor vehicle violations. In order to produce meaningful survey responses,
participants must have enough knowledge and experience with the selected behaviors to answer
personal questions about themselves and vicarious questions about other people’s behavior.
Therefore, this study was not able to examine more serious levels of offending.
Second, although this dissertation introduced variations in risks and rewards to tests of
Stafford and Warr’s (1993) model, additional variations are recommended for future research.
Thus far, tests of Stafford and Warr’s (1993) theory have examined two measures of punishment
– getting stopped by the police and getting arrested. Piquero and Pogarsky (2002) suggest
examination of several other forms of punishment (e.g., court procedure, conviction, and
incarceration) when examining Stafford and Warr’s (1993) theory.
Third, the results of this study and several others illustrate that extralegal considerations
are important to explaining criminal behavior (Paternoster, 1989; Nagin, 1998; Nagin &
Pogarsky, 2001). Expanding the deterrence doctrine to include measures of extralegal costs and
benefits here was an advance; however, this study did not assess prior experiences with or
avoidance of these extralegal costs and benefits.
A fourth limitation is the use of hypothetical vignette methodology. Vignettes have been
used in social sciences since the 1950s and in a variety of research settings (Hughes & Huby,
2002; Sleed, Durrheim, Kriel, Solomon, & Baxter, 2002). Strengths of vignette methodology
include the ability to gather information from larger groups of individuals, to manipulate
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numerous variables simultaneously that would not be feasible in observation studies, and to
circumvent ethical dilemmas that are frequently evident during observation (Gould, 1996). It is
certainly difficult to generalize results revealed from hypothetical scenarios to real-world
applications. However, this type of study was performed because it would be tremendously
difficult to design and conduct research involving offenders engaging in criminal behavior that
would meet ethical standards, and virtually impossible to gather comprehensive information on
prior experiences any other way. Although there are weaknesses for assessing the dependent
variable, it is very difficult to conceive of an ethical alternative. Additionally, few other options
exist for assessing the key independent variables (personal and vicarious experiences with
punishment and punishment avoidance). Despite limitations of vignette methodology for the
purposes of this study, the vignette approach constituted an appropriate technique for testing
Stafford and Warr’s (1993) theory and measuring intentions to offend.
Finally, social desirability bias can be particularly problematic when studying special
populations, including offenders (Block, 1990). Efforts to increase the validity in responses were
enhanced via anonymity and informing respondents that their survey answers and participation in
the study had no effect on their standing with Orange County Corrections. Still, it is important to
recognize that the setting in which the study occurred may have influenced the veracity of the
respondents’ answers.
As noted, this study was the first of its kind to test Stafford and Warr’s (1993)
reconceptualization among a non-conventional population. In addition, this study expanded the
deterrence model to include extralegal considerations. The principal components of the theory –
personal and vicarious experiences with punishment and punishment avoidance – have not
always related to individual’s perceptions of the risk of apprehension and future offending in
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ways that deterrence theory would predict. Future research will need to address the
inconsistencies between theoretical predictions and empirical reality if deterrence theory is to
continue. Other studies are also needed to expand the scrutiny of Stafford and Warr’s
reconceptualization of general and specific deterrence. To assess the generalizability of
deterrence theory, future research needs to consider other crimes beyond those involving alcohol
abuse, drug use, and theft. Research should test the theory with different groups of known
offenders, and vary the risks and rewards examined. Additionally, future research should
consider the deterrent effects of an individual’s personal and vicarious experiences and
avoidance experiences of extralegal consequences. A research agenda addressing the limitations
in the current literature would contribute to a deeper understanding of offender decision-making
and would help clarify what features of deterrence theory remain viable and what features should
be re-evaluated.
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APPENDIX A: OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES
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Concept

Operationalization

Label

Realism of the
hypothetical scenario
Likelihood of offending

How realistic is it (on a scale from 0 to 100) that you would be
in the situation described above?
What is the likelihood (on a scale from 0 to 100) that you would
drive home under the circumstances presented in the scenario?

Realism of the hypothetical
scenario
Likelihood of driving drunk

What is the likelihood (on a scale from 0 to 100) that you would
buy drugs under the circumstances presented in the scenario?

Likelihood of purchasing
illegal drugs

What is the likelihood (on a scale from 0 to 100) that you would
take the cold medicine under the circumstances presented in the
scenario?

Likelihood of shoplifting
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Personal punishment
experience

In the past five years, how many times have you been arrested for
driving when your blood alcohol level was above the legal limit?

Personal punishment
(drunk driving)

In the past five years, how many times have you been arrested for
buying drugs illegally?

Personal punishment
(drug purchase)

In the past five years, how many times have you been arrested for
taking something from a store without paying for it?

Personal punishment
(shoplift)

In the past five years, how many times have you been arrested for
driving a car without the owner’s permission?

Personal punishment
(car theft)

In the past five years, how many times have you been arrested for
vandalizing someone’s property?

Personal punishment
(vandalism)

In the past five years, how many times have you been arrested for
breaking into a house or building?

Personal punishment
(burglary)

In the past five years, how many times have you been arrested for
acting loud, rowdy, or unruly in a public place?

Personal punishment
(public disturbance)

In the past five years, how many times have you been arrested for
hurting or threatening to hurt someone with a weapon?

Personal punishment
(assault)

In the past five years, how many times have you been arrested for
driving without a license?

Personal punishment
(driving without a license)

In the past five years, how many times have you been arrested for
starting a fistfight?

Personal punishment
(fistfight)
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Personal punishment
avoidance

In the past five years, how many times have you previously driven
when you have suspected that your blood alcohol level was above
the legal limit [minus Personal punishment drunk driving]

Personal punishment avoidance
(drunk driving)

In the past five years, how many times have you previously
bought illegal drugs [minus Personal punishment drug purchase]

Personal punishment avoidance
(drug purchase)

In the past five years, how many times have you previously taken
something from a store without paying for it [minus Personal
punishment shoplift]

Personal punishment avoidance
(shoplift)

In the past five years, how many times have you previously driven a
car without the owner’s permission [minus Personal punishment car
theft]

Personal punishment avoidance
(car theft)

In the past five years, how many times have you previously vandalized
someone’s property [minus Personal punishment vandalism]

Personal punishment avoidance
(vandalism)

In the past five years, how many times have you previously broken
into a house or building [minus Personal punishment burglary]

Personal punishment avoidance
(burglary)

In the past five years, how many times have you previously acted
loud, rowdy, or unruly in a public place [minus Personal punishment
public disturbance]

Personal punishment avoidance
(public disturbance)

In the past five years, how many times have you previously hurt or
threatened to hurt someone with a weapon [minus Personal punishment
assault]

Personal punishment avoidance
(assault)

In the past five years, how many times have you previously driven
without a license [minus Personal punishment driving without a license]

Personal punishment avoidance
(driving without a license)

In the past five years, how many times have you previously started a
fistfight [minus Personal punishment fistfight]

Personal punishment avoidance
(fistfight)
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Vicarious punishment
experience

Vicarious punishment
avoidance

Vicarious punishment
experience beyond each
respondent’s immediate
social circle

What percentage of the people you know personally have ever
been charged with drunk driving?

Vicarious punishment
(drunk driving)

What percentage of the people you know personally have ever
been charged with buying illegal drugs?

Vicarious punishment
(drug purchase)

What percentage of the people you know personally have ever
been charged with taking something from a store without paying
for it?
What percentage of the people you know personally do you think
have driven while intoxicated on at least several occasions
[minus Vicarious punishment drunk driving]

Vicarious punishment
(shoplift)
Vicarious punishment avoidance
(drunk driving)

What percentage of the people you know personally do you think
have bought illegal drugs on at least several occasions [minus
Vicarious punishment drug purchase]

Vicarious punishment avoidance
(drug purchase)

What percentage of the people you know personally do you think
have taken something from a store without paying for it on at least
several occasions [minus Vicarious punishment shoplift]
Besides the people you know personally, how often do you think
people who drive after having too much to drink actually get
caught by the police?

Vicarious punishment avoidance
(shoplift)

Besides the people you know personally, how often do you think
people who buy illegal drugs actually get caught by the police?

Vicarious punishment beyond social
circle (drug purchase)

Besides the people you know personally, how often do you think
people who take something from a store without paying for it
actually get caught?

Vicarious punishment beyond social
circle (shoplift)
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Vicarious punishment beyond social
circle (drunk driving)

Vicarious punishment
avoidance beyond each
respondent’s immediate
social circle

Weekday media
consumption

Besides the people you know personally, how often do you think
people drive after having too much to drink [minus Vicarious
punishment beyond social circle drunk driving]

Vicarious punishment avoidance
beyond social circle (drunk driving)

Besides the people you know personally, how often do you think
people buy illegal drugs [minus Vicarious punishment beyond social
circle drug purchase]

Vicarious punishment avoidance
beyond social circle (drug purchase)

Besides the people you know personally, how often do you think
people take something from a store without paying for it [minus
Vicarious punishment beyond social circle shoplift]
During a typical single weekday (Monday through Friday) how
many hours a day (0 to 24) do you spend watching television?

Vicarious punishment avoidance
beyond social circle (shoplift)

During a typical single weekday (Monday through Friday) how
many hours a day (0 to 24) do you spend listening to the radio?

Weekday radio consumption

During a typical single weekday (Monday through Friday) how
many hours a day (0 to 24) do you spend reading newspapers?

Weekday newspaper
consumption

During a typical single weekday (Monday through Friday) how
many hours a day (0 to 24) do you spend reading magazines?

Weekday magazine
consumption

During a typical single weekday (Monday through Friday) how
many hours a day (0 to 24) do you spend surfing the Internet?

Weekday Internet consumption
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Weekday television
consumption

Weekend media
consumption

Media credibility

Media helpfulness

During a typical single weekend day (Saturday and Sunday) how
many hours a day (0 to 24) do you spend watching television?

Weekend day television
consumption

During a typical single weekend day (Saturday and Sunday) how
many hours a day (0 to 24) do you spend listening to the radio?

Weekend day radio
consumption

During a typical single weekend day (Saturday and Sunday) how
many hours a day (0 to 24) do you spend reading newspapers?

Weekend day newspaper
consumption

During a typical single weekend day (Saturday and Sunday) how
many hours a day (0 to 24) do you spend reading magazines?

Weekend day magazine
consumption

During a typical single weekend day (Saturday and Sunday) how
many hours a day (0 to 24) do you spend surfing the Internet?
Which one of the following statements comes closest to describing
your feelings about television?

Weekend day Internet
consumption
Television credibility

Which one of the following statements comes closest to describing
your feelings about the radio?

Radio credibility

Which one of the following statements comes closest to describing
your feelings about newspapers?

Newspaper credibility

Which one of the following statements comes closest to describing
your feelings about magazines?

Magazine credibility

Which one of the following statements comes closest to describing
your feelings about the Internet?
Suppose you were looking for ideas on how to commit a crime.
Circle whether you think movies would be very helpful, somewhat
helpful, not very helpful, or not at all helpful.

Internet credibility

Suppose you were looking for ideas on how to commit a crime.
Circle whether you think music videos would be very helpful,
somewhat helpful, not very helpful, or not at all helpful.
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Movies helpfulness

Music videos helpfulness

Certainty of punishment

Punishment severity

Suppose you were looking for ideas on how to commit a crime.
Circle whether you think magazines and books would be very
helpful, somewhat helpful, not very helpful, or not at all helpful.

Magazines and books
helpfulness

Suppose you were looking for ideas on how to commit a crime.
Circle whether you think newspaper stories would be very helpful,
somewhat helpful, not very helpful, or not at all helpful.

Newspaper stories helpfulness

Suppose you were looking for ideas on how to commit a crime.
Circle whether you think television shows would be very helpful,
somewhat helpful, not very helpful, or not at all helpful.
If you drove home under the circumstances described above,
what is the chance (on a scale from 0 to 100) you would be
pulled over by the police?

Television shows helpfulness

If you bought drugs under the circumstances described above,
what is the chance (on a scale from 0 to 100) you would be
caught by corrections?

Certainty of punishment
(drug purchase)

If you took the cold medicine under the circumstances described
above, what is the chance (on a scale from 0 to 100) you would be
caught by the clerk?
If you are convicted for drunk driving, you will not go to jail
or receive a fine. However your driver’s license will be
suspended for 3/12 months (inmates will be randomly assigned
to one of two license-suspension periods).

Certainty of punishment
(shoplift)

If you are convicted for buying illegal drugs, you will be
sentenced to 20/200 hours of community service (inmates
will be randomly assigned to one of two punishments).

Severity of punishment manipulation
(drug purchase)

If you are convicted for shoplifting the cold medicine you will
not go to jail. However you will receive $100/$500 fine
(inmates will be randomly assigned to one of two punishments).

Severity of punishment manipulation
(shoplift)
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Certainty of punishment
(drunk driving)

Severity of punishment manipulation
(drunk driving)

Extralegal benefits

Shame (extralegal costs)

Morally wrong
(extralegal costs)

How much would you enjoy (on a scale from 0 to 100, where
0 means no enjoyment and 100 means lots of enjoyment)
driving home from the bar?

Extralegal benefits
(drunk driving)

How much would you enjoy (on a scale from 0 to 100, where
0 means no enjoyment and 100 means lots of enjoyment)
buying drugs in the given situation?

Extralegal benefits
(drug purchase)

How much would you enjoy (on a scale from 0 to 100, where
0 means no enjoyment and 100 means lots of enjoyment)
taking the cold medicine without paying for it?
How ashamed would you be of yourself if you drove home from
the bar even if no one else found out (on a scale from 0 to 100,
where 0 means not at all ashamed and 100 means very ashamed)?

Extralegal benefits
(shoplift)

How ashamed would you be of yourself if you bought drugs
even if no one else found out (on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0
means not at all ashamed and 100 means very ashamed)?

Shame (drug purchase)

How ashamed would you be of yourself if you took the cold
medicine without paying for it even if no one else found out (on
a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means not at all ashamed and 100
means very ashamed)?
How morally wrong (on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means
not at all morally wrong and 100 means very morally wrong)
would it be to drive home from the bar?

Shame (shoplift)

How morally wrong (on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means
not at all morally wrong and 100 means very morally wrong)
would it be to buy drugs?

Morally wrong (drug purchase)

How morally wrong (on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means
not at all morally wrong and 100 means very morally wrong)
would it be to take the cold medicine without paying for it?

Morally wrong (shoplift)
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Shame (drunk driving)

Morally wrong (drunk driving)

Impulsivity

Religious salience

I act on impulse.
I often do things on the spur of the moment.
I always consider the consequences before I take action.
I rarely make hasty decisions.
Sometimes I do things on impulse that I later regret.
Occasionally I act first and think later.
Religion is a very important part of my life.
Following God’s commandments is important to me.
In times of personal trouble, I turn to religion for guidance.

Impulsivity index

Religious salience index

Gender

What is your gender?

Gender

Race

What is your race?

Race

Age

What is your age (as of your last birthday)?

Age

Marital status

What is your marital status?

Marital status

Income

What is your weekly income?

Income

Education level

What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

Education

Incarceration length

What date did you begin work release?

Incarceration length
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